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Abstract 
Operation planning studies are essential in maintaining and operating a reliable 
and secure power system. They are based on existing system elements and aim to 
identify the operating limits within which reliability criteria are satisfied. 
Traditionally these studies are performed using deterministic criteria. It requires that a 
power system must be able to withstand an outage of any single component without 
violating any operating limits. However, it has been recognised that the deterministic 
method may no longer be adequate to deal with modern power systems with high 
level of renewable energy penetration. 
In particular, high variability and uncertainty of wind power generation may 
lead to significant load-generation imbalance resulting in large frequency deviations. 
This increases system operation risk, especially in small and isolated power systems 
which have low inertia and limited capabilities to provide frequency responses. 
Therefore, there is a need for investigating alternatives to current power system 
operation planning approaches to cope with the uncertain nature of the intermittent 
generation.  
This thesis proposes a novel probabilistic risk-based approach to evaluate 
power system security quantitatively in short-term (e.g., hour/s up to a day) operation 
planning with significant wind power generation in order to help facilitate day to day 
system operation. The proposed approach deals with steady-state voltage and 
overload evaluations as well as frequency deviation analysis. Load flow calculation 
techniques are used to perform the steady-state voltage and overload evaluations for 
post-disturbance system conditions. An analytical method to approximate frequency 
deviations is developed in order to assess the consequence of these frequency events 
without performing dynamic simulations. As a result, the frequency deviation 
analysis can be run simultaneously with the steady-state voltage and overload 
evaluations in the proposed risk assessment. The system operation risk is defined as 
the product of the probability and severity of system operating states in terms of 
expected load interruption cost. The risk calculation takes into account both the 
randomness of contingencies as well as the uncertainty of operating conditions caused 
 ii 
 
by load and wind power generation forecast errors. The thesis also formulates a 
security constrained economic dispatch approach to determine operating reserve 
requirements in wind integrated power systems. This approach co-optimises operation 
risks resulted from inadequacy of system frequency responses and operation cost 
including energy price and cost of reserve provision. The effectiveness of the 
proposed approaches is illustrated by their application to a simplified model of 
Tasmanian power network, Australia under various system conditions and wind 
generation scenarios. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
1.1 Motivation 
In an attempt to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions from electric power industry 
and deal with diminishing natural resources, many countries are increasing the 
installation of renewable energy, particularly wind power generation (WPG). World 
wind generation capacity has increased significantly in the last decades. By June 2014 
wind power capacity has reached 336 GW and 4% of total worldwide electricity 
usage is supplied from wind power plants [1]. The total installed wind power capacity 
in the United States has increased to 62.3 GW by the third quarter of year 2014 and 
there are over 13.6 GW of wind under construction [2]. The European Union’s total 
installed wind energy capacity reached 117.3 GW in 2013. It would be enough to 
supply 8% of the EU’s electrical power consumption [3]. In Australia, the total 
installed wind capacity is 3.3 GW as in August 2014 [4] and is forecasted to increase 
to 11.5 GW by 2020 [5]. The increasing trend towards renewable forms of generation, 
and in particular wind, is creating new challenges for power system operators. 
Operation planning studies are essential in maintaining a reliable and secure 
power system. These studies are based on existing system elements and aim to 
identify the operating limits within which reliability criteria are satisfied. Their 
timescale can vary from half an hour to a week, a month, or any specified period 
typically less than one year [6]. Security assessment is an important part of the 
operation planning studies. The assessment is performed for various expected 
operation states in the studied period [7]. 
Traditionally security assessment is performed based on deterministic criteria. 
The deterministic criterion, normally (N-1) criterion, requires that a power system 
must be able to withstand an outage of any single system component such as a 
generator, a transformer or a transmission line without violating any system operating 
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limits. Some utilities are also considering (N-2) or (N-1-1) criteria, which mean the 
system is required to withstand the removal of any single element due to maintenance 
and any other due to a failure. This is a worst-case scenario-based criterion – it 
provides a simple rule in system design and operation, and has satisfied the needs of 
the power industry for decades.  
However, the basic weakness of this criterion is that it does not take into 
account the probabilistic nature of system behaviour, the uncertainty of demand and 
generation, and the probabilities of contingencies and network element failures. This 
may lead to results biased from reality and uneconomic decisions [7]. Moreover, in 
the deterministic assessment, operating conditions are only either secure or insecure. 
This method cannot quantify how secure the system is, and hence cannot represent 
the actual system risk which both utilities and customers are facing. It is also 
recognised that the deterministic method may no longer be adequate for modern 
power systems with market driven dispatch and high penetration of renewable energy 
and distributed generation [8]. Increasing installation of unobservable distributed and 
photovalics (PV) generation with unknown operating characteristics increases 
demand uncertainty and forecasting errors. This together with large-scale integration 
of WPG increases system variability and uncertainty due to wind intermittency and 
creates a number of technical challenges in the power system planning and operation. 
This raises a need to investigate new security assessment methods, which can cope 
with the uncertain behaviour of WPG as well as the probabilistic nature of system 
conditions and events in the operation planning studies. 
In addition, one of the most important tasks of power system operators is to 
maintain the balance between the electrical power produced by generators and the 
power consumed by loads including system loses so that the system frequency is 
maintained at or very close to its nominal level. Power system operators often use 
scheduling techniques throughout the day to match generation and demand. 
Additional capacity (generation and responsive load availability) above that needed to 
meet actual demand is made available either on-line or on-standby so that it can be 
called on to assist if an imbalance between load and generation occurs resulting in a 
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frequency deviation. This capacity herein referred to as operating reserves. The way 
in which the system operators deploy and, especially, the way in which they plan for 
these reserves can significantly affect the security and efficiency of operating a power 
system with large amounts of variable generation. Power systems have developed 
their rules and practices based on a long-standing history of operations with the 
dominance of conventional synchronous generators. Operating reserve requirements 
are generally set using deterministic criteria based on system characteristics and 
tailored to achieve a desired level of risk in each power system. It may remain 
constant for all operating conditions during the year. One of the most common 
practices is to schedule the amount of operating reserves equal to the size of the 
largest online infeed so that the system will be able to withstand the outage of any 
single generating unit without the need of load shedding. However, many systems are 
now studying new ways to change these rules and practices where high penetrations 
of variable generation are becoming apparent. Recent studies that assess the impacts 
of high penetration of variable generation, particularly WPG, agree that power system 
operators must find alternative approaches for allocating and deploying operating 
reserves. 
1.2 Scope of the work 
Operating future “green” power systems with high penetration of intermittent 
renewable energy will be a challenging task. Large integration of WPG significantly 
increases the system variability and uncertainty as well as reduces the system 
frequency control capability. This leads to a need for larger flexibility from the 
remaining generation. This flexibility will need to come either from plants that are 
inherently less flexible or from alternative sources of flexibility. It is likely to increase 
the cost of wind integration and could potentially compromise the economic viability 
of power systems with large WPG.  
Ensuring secure and cost-effective system operation requires major changes in 
system planning and operation methods. This thesis focuses on the development of a 
probabilistic approach to assess the system security in short-term (e.g., hour(s)-ahead) 
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operation planning with significant WPG in order to facilitate day to day system 
operation. A security-constrained economic dispatch approach is also developed for 
determining operating reserve to better cope with large integration of WPG to the 
grid. 
To achieve these objectives, this thesis will address three major questions. 
These questions and corresponding answers which are also the main contributions of 
this thesis are outlined as follows. 
Question 1: How does large penetration of wind generation affect system 
operation? 
Answering this question requires: 
 Understanding wind generation technology and its operating 
characteristics, 
 Understanding how the system is currently operated and identify 
operation areas which will be affected by integration of WPG.  
Question 2a: How to take into consideration the variable and uncertain 
characteristics of both system conditions (i.e., random contingencies and demand 
forecasting errors) and WPG in system security assessment? 
The security of a power system can be defined as the degree of risk in its ability 
to withstand random contingencies without interruption to customer service [9]. Risk 
is a conceptual complement providing better measure of the security [10]. The higher 
the risk the lower the security, and vice-versa. Although risk cannot be eliminated 
fully due to unexpected fault events and probabilistic behaviours of power systems, it 
can be assessed and managed to an acceptable level in power system planning, design 
and operation activities [11]. 
A probabilistic approach based on risk assessment techniques is developed to 
evaluate power systems security quantitatively for short-term operation planning. The 
system security is represented by a risk index which is the product of probability and 
severity of system failure in terms of expected load interruption cost taking into 
account both the randomness of contingencies as well as the uncertainty of future 
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operating conditions caused by demand and WPG forecasting errors. The proposed 
approach is concerned with steady-state voltage and overload evaluations, as well as 
system frequency response adequacy. The adequacy of system frequency responses is 
defined as the system capability to prevent frequency from dropping below its 
operating limits [12]. 
Question 2b: How to incorporate the adequacy assessment of system frequency 
responses – a dynamic aspect with steady-state voltage and overload evaluations? 
Since system frequency is a dynamic variable, adequacy assessment of system 
frequency responses often requires running dynamic simulations. However, dynamic 
simulations require dynamic models of system components as well as high 
computation resources and time. Therefore for fast evaluation of system frequency 
response adequacy, we develop a mathematical model to represent the dynamic 
frequency trajectories taking into account the system inertia and frequency control 
services in generation-load imbalance events. The consequences of these events are 
hence evaluated analytically in terms of expected load interruption cost. This 
evaluation is able to run with the steady-state voltage and overload evaluations 
simultaneously in the main security assessment.  A case study will be performed to 
evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. 
Question 3: What is a cost-effective solution for determining operating reserve 
requirements in the presence of significant WPG?  
This thesis develops an optimization approach based on risk assessment 
techniques to find a cost-effective solution for system operating reserve 
determination. Firstly, the adequacy of system frequency responses is assessed in 
terms of operation risk - expected load interruption cost. The resulted risk will then be 
used to determine the reserve requirements by co-optimizing with energy in a 
security-constrained economic dispatch in order to minimise total operation cost 
which is the sum of cost of energy, cost of reserve, and operation risk. As discussed, a 
number of studies have been done investigating the impact of large scale integration 
of WPG on system secondary and tertiary frequency control. Therefore, the focus of 
this thesis is system primary frequency control. A case study will be performed to 
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evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Based on the objectives presented and the approach proposed, this thesis is 
organised as follows. 
Chapter 2 discusses operation challenges associated with large scale 
integration of wind energy. The overview of WPG technology, its operating 
characteristics, and literature review of wind integration challenges will be presented. 
Chapter 3 presents the basic elements of power system risk assessment. The 
evaluation procedure, system component outage models, and fundamental methods 
for the risk evaluation will be presented. 
Chapter 4 presents a novel approach to quantitative risk evaluation of wind 
integrated power systems for short-term operation planning. A case study will be 
performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. 
Chapter 5 presents the development of mathematical models of system 
frequency in load-generation imbalance events, taking into account system inertia and 
frequency control ancillary services. The mathematical models are used in the 
proposed risk assessment approach presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 presents the probabilistic risk-based approach to determine the 
operating reserve requirements in the presence of significant WPG. A case study is 
performed to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions from this work and proposes directions for 
future work. 
Appendix A present the basic probability concepts used in power system risk 
assessment. 
Appendix B shows the single line diagram of the Tasmanian power network 
which is used in the case studies presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2   
Operation Challenges of Wind Integrated Power 
Systems  
2.1 Introduction 
Developing an assessment approach to the system security for operation 
planning with significant wind energy requires the understanding of operation 
challenges caused by large integration of WPG into the system. This chapter presents 
the overview of WPG technology, its operational characteristics and challenges. It 
then provides an in-depth literature review of existing system operation procedures 
and methodologies dealing with these operation challenges.  
2.2 Overview of wind power generation 
2.2.1 Wind power generation technology 
There are four main types of wind turbines: 
1. Type 1: the type 1 wind turbine uses induction generators directly 
connected to the grid. It is normally referred to as a constant/fixed speed 
wind turbine as its rotor speed often varies within a very small range, such 
as 1% to 2% of the rated speed. Fig. 2.1 shows the main structure of the 
type 1 wind turbine. 
2. Type 2: the type 2 wind turbine also uses induction generators directly 
connected to the grid but are equipped with variable rotor resistance 
(controlled by power electronics). By changing the rotor resistance, the 
torque/speed characteristic of the generator is shifted and the rotor speed 
can vary up to 10% from the nominal rotor speed. Therefore, the type 2 
wind turbine is normally referred to as semi-variable speed systems.       
Fig. 2.2 shows the main electrical and mechanical components of the type 2 
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wind turbine. 
 
Fig. 2.1. Structure of type 1 wind turbine. 
 
Fig. 2.2. Structure of type 2 wind turbine 
3. Type 3: the type 3 wind turbine is equipped with a doubly-fed induction 
generator (DFIG) where the stator is directly connected to the grid and the 
rotor is connected through a back-to-back power electronics converter. The 
main structure of the wind turbine is illustrated in Fig. 2.3. The type 3 wind 
turbine is often considered as a limited variable speed wind turbine with its 
rotor speed varying around ±30% of the rated speed. 
4. Type 4: the type 4 wind turbine utilises either synchronous or induction 
Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
 
- 9 - 
 
generators connected to the grid through a full scale power converter. 
Therefore, it is referred to as a fully variable speed wind turbine. The main 
mechanical and electrical components of the type 4 wind turbine are shown 
in Fig. 2.4. Some type 4 wind turbines use direct drive synchronous 
generators such as permanent magnet synchronous generator (PMSG) or 
wound field synchronous generator (WFSG), and hence have no gearbox. 
 
Fig. 2.3. Structure of type 3 wind turbine 
 
Fig. 2.4. Structure of type 4 wind turbine 
The advantage of a constant speed or semi-variable speed wind turbine (Type 1 
and 2) is that it is relatively simple and its price is low compared to variable speed 
wind turbines (Type 3 and 4). However, the type 3 and 4 wind turbines are the most 
common WPG system nowadays thanks to their superior controllability and operating 
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performance such as low voltage ride through (LVRT), high voltage ride through 
(HVRT), frequency support, and power quality to comply with new grid codes for 
WPG worldwide which are becoming more and more strict. 
2.2.2 Characteristics of wind power generation 
Wind energy is characterised by high variability and uncertainty. Variability 
is the expected changes in power system variables whereas uncertainty is the changes 
in power system variables that are unexpected. As with other intermittent renewable 
energy technologies (such as tidal, wave, and solar) WPG has an availability limit 
that varies over time (variability) due to its dependence on the uncontrolled wind 
resource. This variability occurs on all time frames of power system planning and 
operation (seconds to years), with perhaps the most important variations occurring in 
the 10-minute, 1-hour, and 1-day time frames. However, the impact and possible 
incurred cost of these variations on the power system depends upon several factors, 
such as the penetration level and characteristics of the WPG, the characteristics of the 
system load and generation, and the market flexibility [13]. In addition to being 
variable, wind energy cannot accurately be predicted (uncertainty) as accurate 
prediction of future wind speed is not an easy task and the error increases with the 
forecast time horizon. The uncertainty in wind forecasts can be significant and must 
be accounted for in system planning and operation.  The error inherent in wind power 
production forecast will impact the system reliability and operation cost as will 
inaccuracies in assumptions about the forecast errors. Fig. 2.5 shows an example of 
the variability and uncertainty of WPG output [14]. 
The uncertainty in WPG output due to wind forecast errors increases the system 
overall uncertainty. Large WPG forecast errors combined with load forecast errors are 
much more common and can be more severe compared to load forecasts alone [14]. 
This may lead to significant load-generation imbalances resulting in large frequency 
deviations, which in turn, may cause unwanted load shedding (or, in some cases, lead 
to a system black-out). Meanwhile the variability of wind energy changes the daily 
commitment of conventional generation. It increases the variability in the system net 
demand which will require more frequent plant start/stop, partial load operation 
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(generators running off their peak efficiency points), and ramping capability. In order 
to cover for the variability and uncertainty of WPG, more operating reserves may 
need to be scheduled. Fig. 2.6 shows an example of impacts of WPG variability and 
uncertainty on system operating reserves.  
 
Fig. 2.5. Example of wind energy variability and uncertainty. 
 
 
Fig. 2.6. Example of impacts of WPG variability and uncertainty on system operating 
reserves. 
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In addition, modern WPG units, particularly electronics converter-based 
variable-speed wind turbines, also have different mechanism for regulating their 
output and reacting to changes from the grid, such as voltage or frequency 
disturbances, compared to conventional thermal and hydropower generating units 
(asynchronism). Firstly, the moving parts of a wind turbine are not synchronised 
with the system frequency. As a result, the kinetic energy stored in a wind turbine is 
independent of system frequency. In other words, the contribution of a wind turbine 
to system inertia is low to zero. Secondly, since wind turbines are normally operated 
to extract maximum power from wind while wind is an uncontrollable energy source, 
wind turbines power output cannot be increased in response to a frequency drop like 
synchronous generators equipped with a governor. Thus, the integration of wind 
power will reduce the average system inertia and governor ramping capability per 
unit of installed capacity. Especially, if this integration results in the decommission of 
conventional power plants, it will reduce the total system inertia and governor 
ramping capability significantly leading to lower frequency nadirs and higher rate of 
change of frequency (RoCoF). This may cause unwanted load curtailment due to 
under-frequency load-shedding and trip of generators triggering by their RoCoF 
protection relay. Fig. 2.7 shows an example illustrating the effect of large integration 
of WPG on system frequency.  
 
Fig. 2.7. The effect of large integration of WPG on system frequency. 
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Moreover, modern wind turbines are often equipped with fault-ride-through 
devices to prevent tripping during low-voltage faults. If a frequency disturbance is 
accompanied by depressed system voltage, wind generation output is significantly 
reduced for a short period of time (from about 0.5s to 3s), which increases the 
magnitude of the frequency excursion [13]. For example, in a small power system, a 
forced outage of a large generator may lead to a large frequency excursion due to 
sympathetic trips of unobservable generation. This may also draw voltages 
throughout the network down. Wind turbines reduce their active power output during 
and after the fault proportionally to the voltage drop at their terminals due to fault-
ride-through operation as shown in Fig. 2.8. This reduction dramatically increases the 
RoCoF and the maximum dynamic frequency deviation, and hence may lead to 
under-frequency load-shedding. Detailed description of this phenomenon can be 
found in [15]. 
 
Fig. 2.8. Power reduction of a wind farm during a voltage dip. 
These three characteristics – variability, uncertainty, and asynchronism – can 
cause challenges for maintaining a reliable and secure power system. Many studies 
have been performed to better analyse these system impacts. Improved strategies to 
better integrate wind and other variable generation are also being developed by 
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system utilities, balancing area authorities, regional reliability organizations, and 
independent system operators. Demand response, energy storage, and improved wind 
power forecasting techniques have often been described as potential mitigation 
strategies. In recent years, there is also ongoing research to study the use of WPG 
units to support power system frequency control capability by providing active power 
control at fast timescales [16]-[22]. A number of wind power manufacturers have 
implemented frequency response control algorithms to their turbines. 
Although converter-based wind turbines have no inherent inertial and governor 
responses like synchronous generators do, they are capable of injecting more active 
power into the grid by utilizing their converter controller in frequency deviation 
events. There are two types of frequency responses a wind turbine can provide: 
synthetic inertial and governor (frequency droop) responses. The former utilises the 
kinetic energy stored in the wind turbine (e.g., gearbox and blades). The release of 
kinetic energy from a wind turbine can be controlled independently from the RoCoF. 
In theory it can thus even deliver a larger inertial response than a traditional 
synchronous generator. However, if the wind turbine is operating below its rated wind 
speed and hence power output, there will be a recovery period in which the turbine 
power output needs to reduce for the turbine re-acceleration [23]. This phenomenon is 
shown in Fig. 2.9 [24]. Whereas the wind turbine governor response requires it to 
operate at a power output level less than that possible with the available wind speed 
(wind power curtailment). This means the turbine needs to operate at a sub-optimal 
operating point which represents a cost that needs to be considered. Therefore, further 
study is still required to better assess the benefit of the frequency response of wind 
turbines and its consequences before it can be widely implemented in power system 
operating schemes and considered as a new ancillary service market design. 
2.3 Literature review 
Since it is well recognised that the traditional deterministic approach may no 
longer be adequate to deal with modern power systems with increased variability and 
uncertainty, probabilistic methods are becoming more attractive because they can 
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take all variable and uncertain factors into consideration as well as combine 
consequences and probabilities together to truly represent the system security level. 
Allan and Billinton [25] reviewed different reliability evaluation methods and their 
use in modern power systems. The authors proved that probabilistic reliability 
analysis is promising and would become increasingly common and used in practice. 
Billinton and Mo [26] illustrated the rigidity of the deterministic criteria and proposed 
a probabilistic approach to assess variable risks associated with the loss of generation 
and transmission system components. An integrated probabilistic cost-benefit 
analysis is proposed in [27] for making system operational decisions. It enhances 
economic efficiency whilst maintaining the system security.   
 
Fig. 2.9. Inertial response of wind power plant. 
A probabilistic steady-state security assessment using Monte Carlo approach is 
presented in [28] introducing performance indices which are used to assess the impact 
of contingencies on power system security. These indices allow assessing accurately 
the influence of overloads, voltage limit violations and voltage stability problems in 
the power system. The authors developed a probabilistic software package based on 
the proposed approach. Ma et al. [29] presented a probabilistic approach based on the 
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power flow analysis and voltage distribution to evaluate the power system 
vulnerability in terms of voltage magnitudes and loading of transmission lines. The 
proposed probabilistic analysis is conducted without Monte Carlo simulation to avoid 
computational time-consuming problems especially for large scale power systems. In 
[30], a comprehensive power system reliability assessment based on probabilistic 
approach is presented. This integrated approach addressed the issues of component 
reliability as well as the system reliability. Both an enumerative approach and Monte 
Carlo simulation were used. The study also introduced a probabilistic approach for 
estimating available transfer capability.  
A comprehensive series of papers in probabilistic risk-based approaches for a 
various type of security assessment have been published by McCalley and his 
associates [8], [10], [31]-[39]. These assessment approaches take into account the 
probability of a predefined set of contingencies, normally N-1 contingencies, as well 
as the uncertainty of future load. The consequence of these contingencies is measured 
in terms of the violation of operating constraints that these contingencies would 
cause. However, although both elements of the risk assessment are taken into 
consideration, the result is only an indirect quantification of the system risk faced by 
network users [14]. The relation between the estimated risk values and the impact of 
contingencies on these users such as cost of load interruption or price of electricity 
generation is not clear. A severe constraint violation with high severity value does not 
necessarily indicate a large load interruption and vice-versa.  
Another approach to the probabilistic risk-based security assessment has been 
developed by Kirschen and his associates [40]-[43]. In these works, the authors 
generate system contingencies at random instead of using a predefined list of 
contingencies. The impact of these random events is measured in terms of load not 
served and then translated into energy not supplied using a model of load restoration 
process. The value of energy not supplied is multiplied by the estimated value of lost 
load to form the expected cost of an outage that is used to assess the system risk level. 
The weakness of this approach is that it requires a significant amount of computing 
resources as it relies on Monte Carlo simulations. 
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In [44], the authors presented a stochastic model capturing the uncertainties in 
the system load at the wind generator bus to approximate the randomness experienced 
by the system. This stochastic assessment investigates the security and stability of a 
WPG system on an electrical utility to quantify the operational limits of the system. 
Wind power integration is also studied in [45] using probabilistic approach. This 
study investigates different stochastic characteristics in the wind energy integration 
including wind resource availability, generation facility outage, and transmission 
availability. The proposed probabilistic approach can assess the reliability capacity 
cost for wind energy integration with the power system for maintaining system 
reliability.  
A stochastic mixed integer linear optimization scheduling model is built in [46] 
to minimise system operation costs; load and wind power production were treated as 
stochastic inputs. The model is used to study operational impacts of future high wind 
penetrations in Ireland. Risk assessment techniques are also used in [47], [48] for 
short-term wind power commitment and operation planning of wind integrated power 
systems. A comprehensive review of probabilistic and risk-based approaches in 
power system planning is presented in [6]. This review identifies the motivations, 
current status, gaps, and future directions of probabilistic and risk-based planning 
methods. New innovative reliability and risk evaluation methods in power system 
planning and operation with high penetration of WPG are also presented in [49]. 
Probabilistic methods are also used to determine operating reserve requirements 
in order to cope better with the increased system variability and uncertainty caused by 
large integration of WPG. Bouffard et. al. [50]-[52] used probabilistic methods and 
stochastic programming to formulated a short-term forward electricity market-
clearing problem with stochastic security capable of accounting for non-dispatchable 
and variable WPG. The proposed stochastic approach allows the improvement of the 
economic performance of the market by taking advantages of the freely-available 
wind power and by reducing reserve scheduling and hydro-thermal generation unit 
commitment costs. The stochastic approach also permits the expansion of the feasible 
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space of the security-constrained market-clearing problem and hence allows greater 
wind power penetration without sacrificing security.  
Doherty and O’Malley [53] proposed an approach to set spinning reserve 
requirements based on a predefined minimum system reliability level considering the 
installed wind capacity. However, setting a single level of reliability to be achieved at 
all periods of the optimization horizon results in suboptimal solutions as the cost and 
benefit of the reserve provision depends on several factors such as system demand, 
WPG output and units committed. In [54] the authors considered the wind forecast 
uncertainty and set the reserve requirements at 3.5 times of the standard deviation of 
the net demand (demand minus WPG) error to capture more than 99.7% of system 
imbalances. However this approach ignores the probability and extent of the system’s 
contingencies and simply set larger amounts of spinning reserves as the total WPG 
production increases. Dany [55] studied the impact of WPG on primary, secondary 
and tertiary reserves. He concluded that these reserve requirements increase 
proportionally to the installed WPG capacity. However, this conclusion does not take 
into account the cost of providing reserves.  
Persaud et. al. [56] concluded that the spinning reserve requirements are 
inversely proportional to the net demand forecasting accuracy. Therefore, when WPG 
is integrated to a power system, larger amounts of reserve would be required to 
maintain the same level of system security. However, this conclusion is drawn on the 
assumption that the reserve requirement is set based on a predefined security index. 
As a result the authors do not consider the balance that should be attained between the 
cost of and benefit of spinning reserves for an efficient economic operation. Ortega-
Vaquez and Kirschen [57], [58] proposed a probabilistic method to estimate the 
optimal spinning reserve requirements and operating costs in a power system with 
significant WPG. Probabilistic techniques are used in [59], [60] to determine system 
reserve requirements for wind power integration. A probabilistic framework for 
optimal reserve scheduling and N-1 secure daily dispatch of systems with significant 
wind power is also proposed in [61]. It is generally agreed that large integration of 
WPG will result in an increase in the required amount of operating reserves to 
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maintain system reliability. System operators should use the available information to 
estimate the system operating risk, and then schedule operating reserves accordingly. 
In addition, the cost of providing reserves is far from negligible and should be taken 
into account when determining the reserve requirements [58].  
However, most of these studies assume that WPG fast fluctuations can be 
compensated by conventional generation units and the variations in the time frame of 
primary control reserve is small compared to the load variations and outages of large 
conventional units. Therefore, the impact of large scale WPG integration on primary 
reserve requirements and performance is negligible [52], [58]-[61]. These studies 
mainly focus on the steady state behaviour of the secondary and tertiary frequency 
control to estimate the expected social cost of load interruptions due to insufficient 
operating reserves. None of them consider dynamic frequency responses in 
determining the reserve requirement. Only few recent studies focus on the impact of 
WPG on the adequacy of primary frequency response (PFR) [62], [63]. While this 
assumption is usually valid in large systems with high inertia and primary control 
reserves, this may not be true in small and isolated power systems, which have low 
inertia and limited capabilities of providing fast frequency responses. As discussed, in 
these power systems, large scale integration of WPG may significantly reduce the 
system inertia and governor ramping capability as well as increase the rate of change 
of frequency. In addition, with increasing penetration of WPG, a sudden change in 
residual load (demand minus wind generation) caused by unforseen sudden changes 
in demand and/or wind generation may lead to large load-generation imbalances. 
These may lead to significant frequency deviations, which in turn, may cause 
unwanted load shedding or, in some cases, lead to a system black-out. Even in large 
power systems, if the penetration of renewable energy reaches a certain level 
replacing a large portion of synchronous generators, this may reduce the system 
frequency security [64]. Therefore, it is necessary to re-assess the system primary 
frequency control capability and the methods of determining reserve requirements in 
the presence of high penetration of WPG. 
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Chapter 3   
Power System Risk Assessment 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the basic elements of power system risk assessment 
including the evaluation procedure, system component outage models, and 
fundamental evaluation methods.  
Reliability is one of the most important aspects of power system planning and 
operation. Reliability is defined as “the degree to which the performance of a power 
system could results in power being delivered to consumers within accepted standard 
and desired amount” according to the North American Electricity Reliability Council 
(NERC). The performance of a power system in reacting to component failures or 
sudden disturbances can be judged acceptable or unacceptable by reliability criteria. 
Reliability of power systems in much of the literature is divided into two different 
concepts: adequacy and security [65]. Adequacy criteria is defined as reliability 
criteria in terms of violations of static failure conditions while reliability criteria 
based on dynamic factors are called security criteria. However, in practice and many 
research works, the term security is often used to cover both aspects of reliability. It is 
an umbrella word to capture both static and dynamic failure conditions that help to 
identify the limits of acceptable operating conditions for a power system. These 
include overload, under-voltage, voltage instability, transient instability, transient 
voltage dip, and oscillatory instability [8]. Reliability/security analyses involve 
evaluating numerous system contingencies at different operating conditions; 
analysing their consequences to customers, transmission system and generation 
utilities; revealing the most influential factors affecting reliability; identifying the 
operating limits within which reliability criteria are satisfied; and the finding the most 
efficient/economical ways to enhance system reliability [66].  
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Over the last decades, the application of risk assessment in reliability analyses 
has drawn ever-increasing interest in the electric utility industry, particularly since 
large power outage events happened across the globe in recent years. Risk and 
reliability can be considered to have identical implication. They are the two facets of 
the same fact [11]. Risk can be considered as a conceptual complement providing 
better measure of reliability/security [10]. The higher the risk the lower the security, 
and vice-versa. The root origin of risk is the probabilistic behaviour of power 
systems. Random failures of system components are generally out of control of power 
system operators. There are always uncertainties in load forecast. Power flows, 
energy exports and imports under the deregulation environment depend on the 
volatile energy market. The integration of intermittent renewable energy sources such 
as wind and PV also introduce other uncertain factors into power systems. Risk 
assessment and management has become more and more challenging and an essential 
part in power system design, planning and operation today. 
There are three main tasks in risk assessment and management [11]. The first 
task is performing quantitative risk evaluation. The objective of this evaluation is to 
create the quantitative risk indices which should recognise not only the probability of 
failure events but also the severity of their consequences. Secondly, measures to 
reduce risk need to be determined. In order to do this, both the impact of the measures 
on risk reduction and the cost associated with the measures should be quantified. The 
third task is to justify an acceptable risk level. A very important point to be 
recognised is that zero risk can never be achieved as random contingencies are 
unpredictable and uncontrollable. In many situations, a risk level has to be accepted 
as long as it is technically and financially justified. 
Risk management has become ever-increasingly important since the 
introduction of the deregulation framework in the electrical power industry. The new 
competitive operation framework forces utilities to plan and operate their system 
closer to the limit leading to deterioration is system reliability [11]. The large scale 
integration of intermittent energy sources which brings more uncertainties to the 
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system also emphasise the importance of proper risk management in order to maintain 
a reliable and secure power system.  
3.2 Quantitative risk evaluation 
Random contingencies caused by outages of system components such as 
generators, transformers and transmission lines are unavoidable and uncontrollable in 
power system operation. They represent the main causes of a system failure state and 
system risks. The first step in system risk evaluation is to develop component outage 
models and then calculate the probabilities of these events. Component failures are 
classified into two categories: independent and dependent outages. They can be 
further classified according to the outage models such as repairable forced outages or 
planned outages. The probabilities of component outages depend on several factors 
including weather conditions, environment, equipment age, and operating conditions.  
The second step is to select system failure states and calculate their 
probabilities. There are two main methods to do this: state enumeration and Monte 
Carlo simulation. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. The former one 
is generally more efficient if complex operating conditions are not considered while 
Monte Carlo method is more preferable when complex operating conditions are 
considered and the number of severe events is large.  
The third step is to conduct the analysis for system failure states and evaluate 
their consequences. The type of analysis is determined by the system under study. It 
could be a simple power balance calculation, or a complex calculation process 
including power flow, optimal power flow, or even dynamic, transient and stability 
evaluation. In order to perform a quantitative risk analysis, an index/indices truly 
representing system risk should be created. The indices will serve as risk indicators 
that reflect a number of factors such as load/generation profiles and forecast 
uncertainties, component outages, and operational conditions.    
A power system consists of three fundamental functional zones: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. Performing a risk evaluation for the whole system is 
often impractical as such a system is too enormous to handle in terms of study scale, 
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computing capacity, and accuracy requirements. In this case, risk assessment is 
conducted in each functional zone, or composite generation and transmission systems. 
By doing so, the assessment is more realistic. 
In power system risk evaluation, collecting reliability data is as important as 
developing evaluation methods. The required data are the parameters of component 
outage models. They are normally calculated from historical statistics of system 
components. The data must be sufficient to ensure the quality of the risk assessment 
as well as restrictive enough so that unnecessary data are not collected. For a simple 
model, the data of failure and restoration process of system components are needed. 
For a more complex model, the data related to transitions rates between different 
states of the components is required. It is very important to note that the ability to 
include a complex model and high degree of precision in calculation should not 
override the unavoidable uncertainty in the data. 
3.3 Component outage models 
As mentioned earlier, components outages can be generally classified into two 
categories: independent and dependent. The independent outages can be further 
broken down to 4 subcategories which are planned, forced, semi-forced outages, and 
partial failures. There are also various types of dependent outages such as common-
cause outage or cascading outage. A typical example of common-cause outages is a 
simultaneous failure of two overhead lines on the same tower due to tower failure or 
lightning strikes. Malfunction protection coordination may result in failure of several 
components leading to a cascading outage. These dependent outages often lead to 
much more severe consequences than independent outages. In addition, the typical 
characteristic of dependent outages is that an outage state includes more than one 
component failure. The probability of this dependent outage state is often larger than 
the probability of concurrent independent failures of the same components. Therefore, 
system risk associated with dependent outages is often much higher than the one 
caused by independent outages.   
3.3.1 Independent outages 
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3.3.1.1 Planned outage 
Planned outages are scheduled by personal for maintenance, replacement, or an 
operational requirement. Two methods can be applied to model a planned outage. The 
first method assumes that the failure and recovery time of a planned outage follow 
given distributions. The distribution parameters are estimated from historical data of 
planned outage activities. In the first method, a planned outage is considered as a 
random event. Its state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 3.1. 
 
Fig. 3.1. State transition diagram for planned outages. 
Therefore, the average unavailability due to planned outage is 
𝑈𝑝 =
𝜆𝑝
𝜆𝑝 + µ𝑝
=
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑝 +𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝
=
𝑓𝑝 ×𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝
8760
                         (3.1) 
where 𝜆𝑝, µ𝑝, and 𝑓𝑝 are the failure rate (failures/year), the repair rate (repairs/year), 
and the average failure frequency (failures/year) due to planned outages, respectively. 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝 is the mean time to repair (hours) and 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑝 is the mean time to planned 
outage (hours).  From Equation (3.1), the following relationships can be obtained. 
µ𝑝 =
8760
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝
                                                                   (3.2) 
𝜆𝑝 =
8760
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑝
=
𝑓𝑝
1 −
𝑓𝑝
µ𝑝
⁄
                                                    (3.3) 
𝑓𝑝 =
8760
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑝 +𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝
=
𝜆𝑝
1 +
𝜆𝑝
µ𝑝⁄
                                          (3.4) 
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It is important to note that 𝜆𝑝 and 𝑓𝑝 are two different terms as this can be seen 
from Equations (3.3) and (3.4). In most cases, they are numerically close as normally 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝 ≪ 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑝. However 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑝 can be quite large in some certain cases, such 
as the repair time for a sub-marine cable. 
The second method is to recognise a planned outage as the scheduled event that 
occurs at pre-determined intervals but not a random event. For example, an overhead 
line is scheduled to be out of service for three days for maintenance. This planned 
outage will be defined by its start and end dates and can be easily modelled by taking 
out the component during the planned outage period in the simulation process. 
3.3.1.2  Forced outage 
Force outages occur randomly and are uncontrollable. Most of forced outages in 
power systems are repairable, whereas some fatal failure events which are non-
repairable can also happen. Similar to planned outages, repairable forced outages can 
be modelled by a state transition diagram shown in Fig. 3.2.  
 
Fig. 3.2. State transition diagram for repairable forced outages. 
and the component unavailability due to repairable forced outage is 
𝑈𝑓 =
𝜆𝑓
𝜆𝑓 + µ𝑓
=
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑓
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑓 +𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑓
=
𝑓𝑓 ×𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑓
8760
                         (3.5) 
where 𝜆𝑓, µ𝑓, 𝑓𝑓, 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑓, and 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑓 are the failure rate (failures/year), the repair 
rate (repairs/year), the average failure frequency (failures/year), the mean time to 
repair (hours), and the mean time to failure (hours), respectively.  
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We also can combine Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2 to create a state space diagram for a 
system component with both planned and repairable forced outage as shown in      
Fig. 3.3. 
 
Fig. 3.3. State space diagram for both planned and repairable forced outages. 
Applying Markov method [11] to the above state diagram we have 
𝑓𝑝 =
𝜆𝑝µ𝑝µ𝑓
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + µ𝑝µ𝑓
                                                 (3.6) 
𝑓𝑓 =
𝜆𝑓µ𝑓µ𝑝
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + µ𝑝µ𝑓
                                                 (3.7) 
𝑃𝑝 =
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + µ𝑝µ𝑓
=
𝑓𝑝
µ𝑝
                                         (3.8) 
𝑃𝑓 =
𝜆𝑓µ𝑝
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + µ𝑝µ𝑓
=
𝑓𝑓
µ𝑓
                                         (3.9) 
𝑃𝑢𝑝 =
µ𝑝µ𝑓
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + µ𝑝µ𝑓
=
𝑓𝑝
𝜆𝑝
=
𝑓𝑓
𝜆𝑓
=
𝑓𝑝 + 𝑓𝑓
𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝑓
=
𝑓
𝜆
                 (3.10) 
Chapter 3 : Power System Risk Assessment 
 
- 27 - 
 
where 𝑃𝑝, 𝑃𝑓, and 𝑃𝑢𝑝 are the probabilities of the planned outage, repairable forced 
outage and up states of the component, respectively. The total failure probability is 
𝑈𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑃𝑝 + 𝑃𝑓 =
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + µ𝑝µ𝑓
                            (3.11) 
However, in reality the outage frequencies and repair times of components are 
recorded instead of the outage rates. Therefore, it is often assumed that planned 
outages and repairable forced outages of a system component are not mutually 
exclusive in order to reduce the complexity in collecting input data. The planned and 
repairable forced outages are then represented using two separate two-state models as 
shown in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2. In this case, the total failure probability is 
𝑈𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 1 − (1 − 𝑈𝑝)(1 − 𝑈𝑓) =
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝𝜆𝑓
𝜆𝑝µ𝑓 + 𝜆𝑓µ𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝𝜆𝑓 + µ𝑝µ𝑓
         (3.12) 
The difference between Equations (3.11) and (3.12) is only associated with the term 
of 𝜆𝑝𝜆𝑓 in both the denominator and numerator. As generally 𝜆𝑝 ≪ µ𝑝 and 𝜆𝑓 ≪ µ𝑓 
the difference is negligible. 
3.3.1.3 Semi-forced outage 
Semi-forced outages refer to the case in which a system component sustains a 
physical issue leading to an outage with a time delay that depends on a forced reason 
but can be scheduled. For example, a transformer with oil leakage does not immediate 
fail but will do so within a limited time. This time delay depends on several factors 
such as the severity of leakage, the availability of manpower for repair, or the 
possibility of reducing the leakage by some temporary measures. Therefore, semi-
forced outages are generally included in risk assessment for short-term operation 
planning but excluded in long-term system planning. It is also important to note that 
although a semi-force outage can be scheduled, it cannot be treated as a planned 
outage because its time delay is limited. It also cannot be considered as a 
deterministic event since the issue happens randomly. The state space diagram for a 
semi-forced outage is shown in Fig. 3.4.  
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Fig. 3.4. State space diagram for a semi-forced outage. 
Applying Markov approach to the model we can obtain the following formulas:  
𝑓𝑠 =
𝜆𝑠µ𝑠µ𝑠𝑜
𝜆𝑠µ𝑠 + 𝜆𝑠µ𝑠𝑜 + µ𝑠µ𝑠𝑜
                                                 (3.13) 
𝑃𝑠𝑝 =
𝜆𝑠µ𝑠
𝜆𝑠µ𝑠 + 𝜆𝑠µ𝑠𝑜 + µ𝑠µ𝑠𝑜
=
𝑓𝑠
µ𝑠𝑜
                                        (3.14) 
𝑃𝑠𝑜 =
𝜆𝑠µ𝑠𝑜
𝜆𝑠µ𝑠 + 𝜆𝑠µ𝑠𝑜 + µ𝑠µ𝑠𝑜
=
𝑓𝑠
µ𝑠
                                         (3.15) 
𝑃𝑠𝑢 =
µ𝑠µ𝑠𝑜
𝜆𝑠µ𝑠 + 𝜆𝑠µ𝑠𝑜 + µ𝑠µ𝑠𝑜
=
𝑓𝑠
𝜆𝑠
                                        (3.16) 
where 𝜆𝑠, µ𝑠, and µ𝑠𝑜 are the transition rate from the up state to the pre-outage state, 
the repair rate which is the reciprocal of the repair time, and the transition rate from 
the pre-outage state to the outage state which is the reciprocal of the time delay, 
respectively. 𝑓𝑠 is the frequency of the issue occurrence per year. 𝑃𝑠𝑝, 𝑃𝑠𝑜, and 𝑃𝑠𝑢 are 
the probabilities of the pre-outage, outage, and up states of the component. Generally, 
there are three steps to calculate these probabilities. Firstly, historical data or an 
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engineering analysis could be used to estimate the average values of 𝑓𝑠, the repair 
time (µ𝑠), and the time delay (µ𝑠𝑜). Secondly, 𝜆𝑠 is calculated using Equation (3.13). 
The third step is to use Equations (3.14) to (3.16) to calculate the three state 
probabilities of the semi-forced outage.    
3.3.1.4 Partial failure 
A partial failure of a system component is when the component sustains a non-
severe problem leading but can still operate in a derated state. Fig. 3.5 shows a three 
state transition diagram of a component with partial failure. However, in reality, a 
repair is often carried to bring the component back to the full-up state but not the 
derated state. Therefore, it is reasonable to ignore the transitions between the derated 
and full-down states. The new simplified state space diagram is shown in Fig. 3.6. 
 
Fig. 3.5. State space diagram for a component with a derated state. 
Applying Markov method to the above state diagram we have 
𝑓 =
𝜆µµ𝑑
𝜆µ𝑑 + 𝜆𝑑µ + µµ𝑑
                                                 (3.17) 
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𝑓𝑑 =
𝜆𝑑µ𝑑µ
𝜆µ𝑑 + 𝜆𝑑µ + µµ𝑑
                                                 (3.18) 
𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 =
𝜆µ𝑑
𝜆µ𝑑 + 𝜆𝑑µ + µµ𝑑
=
𝑓
µ
                                        (3.19) 
𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
𝜆𝑑µ
𝜆µ𝑑 + 𝜆𝑑µ + µµ𝑑
=
𝑓𝑑
µ𝑑
                                    (3.20) 
𝑃𝑢𝑝 =
µµ𝑑
𝜆µ𝑑 + 𝜆𝑑µ + µµ𝑑
=
𝑓
𝜆
=
𝑓𝑑
𝜆𝑑
                                    (3.21) 
where 𝜆 and µ are the transition rates between full-up and full-down states; , 𝜆𝑑 and 
µ𝑑 are the transition rates between full-up and derated states; 𝑓 and 𝑓𝑑 are the 
frequencies of full failure and derating events. 𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛, 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑, and 𝑃𝑢𝑝 are the 
probabilities of full failure, derated and up states of the component, respectively. 
 
Fig. 3.6. Simplified state space diagram for a component with a derated state. 
3.3.2 Dependent outages 
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3.3.2.1 Common-cause outage 
A common-cause outage refers to coincident failures of various components 
due to a common cause. Typically, a common-cause outage is combined with 
independent outages into a composite state space model [66]. An example of two 
components is shown in Fig. 3.7.  
 
Fig. 3.7. State space diagram for a common cause outage including two components. 
The above composite model has been widely used for years. However, it has 
two disadvantages. Firstly, it assumes that an independent outage and a common-
cause outage are mutually exclusive but this is not always the case. Let’s consider the 
model of two overhead lines on the same tower. An independent failure of the lines 
can happen at the same time as the tower failure. The second advantage is the 
complexity of the composite model if there are more than two components. The 
number of states in the model increases exponentially with the number of 
components.  
There is another approach to model common-cause outages. It is to use the 
individual two-state models for the common-cause failure and each independent 
failure, and the intersection concept for combinations of the failures. These outages 
are independent and not exclusive from each other. This approach is shown in       
Fig. 3.8. 
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Fig. 3.8. Two-state individual models for independent (a) and common-cause (b) 
failures. 
The individual models can be represented using the following equations: 
𝜆𝑖 =
𝑓𝑖
1 −
𝑓𝑖
µ𝑖⁄
        (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛)                                     (3.22) 
𝑃𝑖𝐷 =
𝜆𝑖
𝜆𝑖 + µ𝑖
        (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛)                                     (3.23) 
𝑃𝑖𝑈 =
µ𝑖
𝜆𝑖 + µ𝑖
        (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛)                                     (3.24) 
𝜆𝑐 =
𝑓𝑐
1 −
𝑓𝑐
µ𝑐⁄
                                                     (3.25) 
𝑃𝑐𝐷 =
𝜆𝑐
𝜆𝑐 + µ𝑐
                                                     (3.26) 
𝑃𝑐𝑈 =
µ𝑐
𝜆𝑐 + µ𝑐
                                                    (3.27) 
where 𝜆𝑖, µ𝑖 and 𝑓𝑖 are the failure rate (failures/year), repair rate (repairs/year), and 
the failure frequency (failures/year) of the ith component (there are n components in 
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total); 𝑃𝑖𝐷 and 𝑃𝑖𝑈 are the probabilities of the ith component in the down and up 
states; 𝜆𝑐, µ𝑐 and 𝑓𝑐 are the failure rate, repair rate, and the failure frequency of the 
common-cause outage of the n components; 𝑃𝑐𝐷 and  𝑃𝑐𝑈 are the probabilities of the 
common-cause outage happening and not happening. 
3.3.2.2 Component-group outage 
When a component in a group consisting of several components fails leading to 
concurrent outages of all the components, this is called a component-group outage. It 
is similar to and can be considered as a specific case of the common-cause outage. 
The only difference is that any component associated with the common-cause failure 
can also have its independent failure, whereas in the component-group outage all the 
components always go to outage state together. Therefore, the two-state model shown 
in Fig. 3.8(b) and Equations (3.25) to (3.27) can be used for a component-group 
outage. Fig. 3.9 shows an example of the group failure. It is a simple network with 
two lines transferring power from a generator through a transformer. There is a circuit 
breaker (CB) at the end of each line. These two breakers (CB1 and CB2), busbar 
(BB) and transformer (TR) form a group of four components. A short-circuit on any 
of the components will result in their simultaneous outages. 
 
Fig. 3.9. An example of a component-group outage. 
3.3.2.3 Cascading outage 
A cascading outage is defined as an event in which a component failure leads to 
consecutive failures of other components. The first component failed is called the 
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cascading outage trigger. A cascading outage is often the main reason for a whole 
system blackout. The state space diagram for a cascading outage is shown in          
Fig. 3.10.  
 
Fig. 3.10. State space diagram for a cascading outage. 
where State 0 indicates the normal state; State 1 corresponds to the failure of the 
trigger component; State 2 to the second component’s outage; and so on. It is 
assumed that all the failed components would return to service (normal state) at the 
same time. A set of equations for the model can be obtained using Markov method as 
this has been done for the previous outage models. However, in real systems only 
State 0 and N are considered as the transition from a state i to state i+1 is very fast 
that no action can be carried out. This assumption allows use of the simple model 
between State 0 and N, which is similar to that for the common-cause outage shown 
in Fig. 3.8(b). State 0 indicates that all the components are up, whereas all of them are 
down in State N. Failure and repair rates between the two states are those of the 
trigger component. 
3.4 Risk evaluation methods 
There are four fundamental methods in power system risk evaluation [11]: the 
probability convolution, series and parallel networks, Markov equations, and 
frequency-duration approaches. The main objective of these methods is to calculate 
risk indices. The methods are selected from a number of general reliability techniques 
since they are important concepts and can be directly applied to simple power system 
risk assessment. For example, Markov equations and the series network concept have 
been used to develop the outage models of individual components as shown in 
previous sections. 
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For risk assessment of large and complex power systems, selection of system 
states and calculation of their probabilities are two key processes. There are two main 
methods to select system states as mentioned earlier: state enumeration and Monte 
Carlo simulation. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. The former one 
is generally more efficient if outage probabilities of components are quite small and 
complex operating conditions are not considered. Monte Carlo method is more 
preferable when complex operating conditions are considered and/or the number of 
severe events is large.  
3.4.1 Probability convolution 
The mathematical definition of convolution is as follows. Assuming that two 
independent random variables X and Y have the probability density functions g(x) and 
h(y), respectively. The probability function s(z)  of the random variable Z=X-Y is the 
following integral, which is called convolution: 
 𝑠(𝑧) = ∫ 𝑔(𝑤) × ℎ(𝑤 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑤
+∞
−∞
                                     (3.28) 
In some simple cases, a risk assessment is nothing more than the probability 
convolution. For example, the core function of a generation system risk assessment is 
calculation of the difference between the generation capacity and the load level as 
two random variables following probability distributions. This is the concept of 
probability convolution.  
In power system risk assessment, a risk index is often the mean value of the 
random variable Z. The mean can be theoretically calculated with the probability 
density function s(z). However, as Equation (3.28) is not suitable for use in actual 
application, it is better to develop the discrete expression of the difference between 
the two random variables. Given the two random variables X and Y with the following 
discrete probability density function 
{
𝑝(𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖              (𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛)
𝑝(𝑌 = 𝑌𝑗) = 𝑝𝑗              (𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑚)
                                (3.29) 
the mean value of the random variable Z is  
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?̅? =∑∑(𝑋𝑖 − 𝑌𝑗)𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗          
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                     (3.30) 
A risk index is often the mean value of Z under a given condition. For example, 
if X represents the load level and Y represent the generation capacity, the expected 
load not supplied (ELNS) should be the mean of Z under the condition of X>Y. It is 
easy to incorporate this condition in the discrete convolution as shown below: 
?̅? =∑∑𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑋𝑖 − 𝑌𝑗)𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗          
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                (3.31) 
3.4.2 Series and parallel networks [67] 
The series and parallel network is defined here as the logical relationship 
between the failure/success of the network and the failure/success of its components. 
A series network is defined as a network in which a failure of any of its components 
leads to the network failure or all the components must be up for the network success. 
In contrast, a parallel network is a network in which all the components must fail for 
the network failure or only one of its components needs to be up for the network 
success. 
The series or parallel network does not refer to a topological structure of power 
system components, even though it is often consistent with the topology of a physical 
system. A radial distribution system generally can be modelled as a series network. A 
transmission line with double circuits can be modelled as a parallel network. A simple 
transmission system consists of towers and double overhead lines or a simple 
substation configuration can be represented as a network including series and parallel 
branches.  
3.4.2.1 Series network 
Let us consider the case of two repairable components in series as shown in  
Fig. 3.11. From the definition of the series network, we can have the following 
equations: 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑈1 + 𝑈2 − 𝑈1𝑈2                                            (3.32) 
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𝜆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2                                                    (3.33) 
𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝐴1𝐴2                                                     (3.34) 
where A indicates the availability, U the unavailability, and 𝜆 the failure rate; the 
subscripts 1, 2 and series represent Components 1, 2, and the equivalent series 
network, respectively. For a repairable system, combining Equations (3.1) and (3.34) 
we have  
 (1 −
𝜆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝜆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜇𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
) = (1 −
𝜆1
𝜆1 + 𝜇1
)(1 −
𝜆2
𝜆2 + 𝜇2
)                   (3.35) 
 
Fig. 3.11. Equivalent series network of two repairable components. 
By substituting Equation (3.33) into (3.35) and the relationship between r the 
repair time and 𝜇 the repair rate, the equivalent repair time and the failure frequency 
for the series network can be calculated by 
𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 =
𝜆1𝑟1 + 𝜆2𝑟2 + 𝜆1𝑟1𝜆2𝑟2
𝜆1 + 𝜆2
                                       (3.36) 
𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑓1(1 − 𝑓2𝑟2) + 𝑓2(1 − 𝑓1𝑟1)                                  (3.37) 
Equations (3.32) to (3.34), (3.36), and (3.37) are used to calculate risk indices 
of the series network. Although these equations are derived from the network of two 
components, it is also straightforward to apply them to a series network of several 
components. Firstly, it is applied to any two components. Then the equivalent series 
network of the first two components is considered as a single component and 
combined with the third component, and so on. 
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3.4.2.2 Parallel network 
The equivalent parallel network of two repairable components is shown in    
Fig. 3.12.  
 
Fig. 3.12. Equivalent parallel network of two repairable components. 
From the definition of parallel network, we have: 
𝑈𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 = 𝑈1𝑈2                                                      (3.38) 
𝜇𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2                                                    (3.39) 
𝐴𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 = 𝐴1 + 𝐴2 − 𝐴1𝐴2                                           (3.40) 
𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 =
𝑟1𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
                                                   (3.41) 
All the symbols are the same as those defined in Section 3.4.2.1 except the subscript 
parallel represent the equivalent parallel network. For repairable components, using 
Equations (3.1) and (3.38) gives 
𝜆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙
𝜆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 + 𝜇𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙
= (
𝜆1
𝜆1 + 𝜇1
)(
𝜆2
𝜆2 + 𝜇2
)                          (3.42) 
Substituting Equation (3.41) into (3.42), we get 
𝜆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 =
𝜆1𝜆2(𝑟1 + 𝑟2)
1 + 𝜆1𝑟1 + 𝜆2𝑟2
                                       (3.43) 
Applying Equations (3.41) and (3.43) we obtain 
𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 = 𝑓1𝑓2(𝑟1 + 𝑟2)                                          (3.44) 
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Equations (3.38) to (3.41), (3.43), and (3.44) are used to calculate risk indices 
of the parallel network. Similarly these equations can be repeatedly applied to a 
parallel network of multiple components. A network consisting of both series and 
parallel branches can be assessed through combinations of the equations derived in 
Section 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2. 
3.4.3 Markov equations [67] 
The Markov equation method is based on a state space diagram. It is very useful 
in modelling the failures of individual components as shown in Section 3.3. The 
Markov approach can be used to solve both the time dependent and limiting state 
probabilities. The former is represented by a set of differential equations while the 
latter by a set of algebraic equations. In power system risk assessment, there are often 
limiting state probabilities and hence only the Markov equations for limiting state 
probabilities is considered. 
The main advantage of this technique is the clear picture of all states and 
transitions between them. However, it is difficult to apply the method to a large 
system since the number of system states increases exponentially with the number of 
components. For a system with N two states (up and down) components, the number 
of system states is 2
N
. When N is large, it is impossible to draw a state space diagram. 
Let us use the system consisting of two repairable components as an example to 
explain the Markov method. There are 6 steps: 
1. Step 1: Build a state space diagram according to the transitions of component 
states. Fig. 3.13 shows the four states and their transitions for the system. 
2. Step 2: Build the transition matrix based on the state space diagram. The 
number of columns and rows of the matrix are the same as the number of 
system states. Or in other words, each system state corresponds to one row 
and one column. If there is a transition from State i to State j, the transition 
rate is filled as the element at the ith row and jth column. Otherwise, the 
element is filled by zero. The diagonal element in each row is filled by a 
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value so that the sum of all elements in this row is 1.0. For the given system 
with two repairable components, the transition matrix is 
𝑻 =
[
 
 
 
1 − (𝜆1 + 𝜆2) 𝜆1 𝜆2 0
𝜇1 1 − (𝜇1 + 𝜆2) 0 𝜆2
𝜇2 0 1 − (𝜆1 + 𝜇2) 𝜆1
0 𝜇2 𝜇1 1 − (𝜇1 + 𝜇2)]
 
 
 
       (3.45) 
It should be noted that the transition matrix T given by Equation (3.45) is not 
a probability matrix as 𝜆 and 𝜇 are not probabilities. 
 
Fig. 3.13. State space diagram of two repairable components. 
3. Step 3: Apply the Markov method which states that the limiting state 
probabilities would not change in the further transition process. It can be 
expressed as 
𝑷𝑻 = 𝑷                                                            (3.46) 
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where 𝑷 is the limiting state probability vector. Equation (3.46) can be 
rewritten as 
𝑷(𝑻 − 𝑰) = 𝟎                                                            (3.47) 
where 𝑰 is the unit matrix. For the given system, Equation (3.47) is expressed 
in a full matrix form as follows 
[𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 𝑃4]
[
 
 
 
−(𝜆1 + 𝜆2) 𝜆1 𝜆2 0
𝜇1 −(𝜇1 + 𝜆2) 0 𝜆2
𝜇2 0 −(𝜆1 + 𝜇2) 𝜆1
0 𝜇2 𝜇1 −(𝜇1 + 𝜇2)]
 
 
 
= [0 0 0 0]                                                                                                 (3.48) 
Equation (3.48) can be rewritten as 
[
 
 
 
−(𝜆1 + 𝜆2) 𝜇1 𝜇2 0
𝜆1 −(𝜇1 + 𝜆2) 0 𝜇2
𝜆2 0 1 − (𝜆1 + 𝜇2) 𝜇1
0 𝜆2 𝜆1 1 − (𝜇1 + 𝜇2)]
 
 
 
[
𝑃1
𝑃2
𝑃3
𝑃4
] = [
0
0
0
0
] (3.49) 
4. Step 4: Add the full probability condition – the sum of the probabilities of all 
system states should be 1. 
[𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃3 + 𝑃4] = 1                                        (3.50) 
The Markov matrix equation obtained in Step 3 has a rank of N-1, where N is 
the number of system states. In other words, only N-1 equations are 
independent and the full probability condition has to be added. In the given 
example, Equation (3.50) will replace any one of the four equations in 
Equation (3.49) in order to solve the four system state probabilities. If the 
first equation in (3.49) is replaced by Equation (3.50) we have 
 [
1 1 1 1
𝜆1 −(𝜇1 + 𝜆2) 0 𝜇2
𝜆2 0 1 − (𝜆1 + 𝜇2) 𝜇1
0 𝜆2 𝜆1 1 − (𝜇1 + 𝜇2)
] [
𝑃1
𝑃2
𝑃3
𝑃4
] = [
1
0
0
0
]  (3.51) 
5. Step 5: Solve the Markov matrix equation obtained in Step 4 using a linear 
algebraic algorithm. For the given example, the solution is as follows: 
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𝑃1 =
µ1µ2
(𝜆1 + µ1)(𝜆2 + µ2)
                                          (3.52) 
𝑃2 =
𝜆1µ2
(𝜆1 + µ1)(𝜆2 + µ2)
                                          (3.53) 
𝑃3 =
µ1𝜆2
(𝜆1 + µ1)(𝜆2 + µ2)
                                          (3.54) 
𝑃4 =
𝜆1𝜆2
(𝜆1 + µ1)(𝜆2 + µ2)
                                          (3.55) 
6. Step 6: The frequency and duration can be calculated if necessary using the 
frequency-duration method described in the next subsection.  
3.4.4 Frequency-duration approaches [67] 
The frequency-duration method is a technique to calculate the frequency and 
duration from the state probabilities and transition rates. The frequency of 
encountering State i is calculated by 
𝑓𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖∑𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑑
𝑘=1
=∑𝑃𝑗𝜆𝑗
𝑀𝑒
𝑗=1
                                            (3.56) 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the probability of State i, 𝑃𝑗 is the probability of a state directly 
communicating to State i, 𝜆𝑘 or 𝜆𝑗 is the transition (failure or repair) rate, 𝑀𝑑 is the 
number of the rates departing from State i, and 𝑀𝑒 is the number of the rates entering 
State i. Equation (3.56) also indicates the basic concept in the frequency balance 
method, that is the frequency of leaving a state is equal to the frequency of entering 
the state for any state in an ergodic system. For example, the frequency of leaving or 
entering State 1 in Fig. 3.13 is 
𝑓1 = 𝑃1(𝜆1 + 𝜆2) = 𝑃2µ1 + 𝑃3µ2 =
µ1µ2(𝜆1 + 𝜆2)
(𝜆1 + µ1)(𝜆2 + µ2)
               (3.57) 
The frequency of transition from State i to State j is calculated by 
𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖𝜆𝑖−𝑗                                                               (3.58)  
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where 𝑃𝑖 is the probability of State i and 𝜆𝑖−𝑗 is the transition rate from State i to State 
j. Generally, 𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓𝑗𝑖 if there are both transitions from State i to State j and vice versa 
in an ergodic system. For example, the two transition frequencies between State 1 to 
State 2 in Fig. 3.13 are 
𝑓12 = 𝑓21 = 𝑃1𝜆1 = 𝑃2µ1 =
µ1µ2𝜆1
(𝜆1 + µ1)(𝜆2 + µ2)
                     (3.59) 
The mean duration of staying in a state is the reciprocal of the sum of all 
departure rates and can be calculated directly from the state space diagram: 
𝑑𝑖 =
1
∑ 𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑑
𝑘=1
                                                    (3.60) 
where 𝑑𝑖 is the mean duration of staying in State i. 𝜆𝑘 and 𝑀𝑑 are the same as defined 
in Equation (3.56). For State 1 in Fig. 3.13, the mean duration is 
𝑑1 =
1
𝜆1 + 𝜆2
                                                             (3.61) 
3.4.5 State enumeration 
State enumeration is based on the expansion of the following expression: 
(𝑃1 + 𝑄1) × (𝑃1 +𝑄1) × …× (𝑃𝑁 + 𝑄𝑁)                                (3.62) 
where 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑄𝑖 are the success and failure probabilities of the ith component and N 
is the number of components in the system. The probability of a system state is given 
by 
𝑃(𝑠) =∏𝑄𝑖
𝑁𝑓
𝑖=1
∏ 𝑃𝑗
𝑁−𝑁𝑓
𝑗=1
                                                       (3.63) 
where 𝑁𝑓 and 𝑁 − 𝑁𝑓 are the numbers of failed and non-failed components in State s, 
respectively. 𝑁𝑓 = 0 in the normal state in which all the components are up. Then 
Equation (3.63) becomes 
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𝑃(𝑠) =∏𝑃𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                             (3.64) 
Based on the concepts given in Section 3.4.4, the system state frequency and 
the mean duration are calculated as follows 
𝑓(𝑠) = 𝑃(𝑠)∑𝜆𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                             (3.65) 
𝑑(𝑠) =
1
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                             (3.66) 
where 𝜆𝑖 is the departure rate of the ith component in State s. It is the failure rate if 
the component is up, and is the repair rate if the component is down. 
As can be seen from Equation (3.63), all the enumerated system states are 
mutually exclusive. Therefore, the cumulative failure probability is the direct sum of 
the probabilities of all failure states: 
𝑃𝑓 =∑𝑃(𝑠) 
𝑠∈𝑺
                                                            (3.67) 
where S is the set of all system failure states. The cumulative failure frequency is 
given by 
𝐹𝑓 =∑𝑓(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑺
− ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑖,𝑗∈𝑺
                                                            (3.68) 
where 𝑓𝑖𝑗 is the transition frequency from State i to State j. Since it is almost 
impossible to calculate these transition frequencies in the state enumeration approach, 
they are often neglected in practical application. This assumption is generally 
acceptable as the transitions between system failure states are very rare, whereas the 
transitions between the normal and failure states are dominant in real application. 
Equation (3.68) can be rewritten as 
𝐹𝑓 =∑𝑓(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑺
                                                            (3.69) 
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The mean duration of residing in the set of system failure states is 
𝐷𝑓 =
𝑃𝑓
𝐹𝑓
                                                            (3.70) 
For each system failure state, any risk index function such as load curtailment, 
C(s), can be obtained through system analysis techniques. The mathematical 
expectation of the index function for all system failure states is given by 
𝐸(𝐶) =∑𝐶(𝑠)𝑃(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑺
                                            (3.71) 
A very important note is that it is not computationally feasible to enumerate all 
system states for a system consisting of a large number of components as the number 
of states increase exponentially with the number of components. It is common to stop 
at a given enumeration depth. Another common criterion is to determine a suitable 
cut-off threshold of system state probability. The system states whose probability is 
lower than the threshold would be ignored. It should be noted that compared to Monte 
Carlo approaches, state enumeration is more effective for a system with a relatively 
small number of components and/or low outage probabilities. State enumeration also 
cannot model time-dependent events.     
3.4.6 Nonsequential Monte Carlo simulation [68, 69] 
Nonsequential Monte Carlo simulation is widely used in power system risk 
evaluation. It is often called the state sampling approach. The main concept is that a 
system state is a combination of all component states and each component state can 
be determined by sampling the probability of the component occurring in that state. 
The main difference between nonsequential Monte Carlo simulation and state 
enumeration is how to select system states and how to calculate individual state 
probabilities. 
Each component is modelled using a uniform distribution between [0, 1]. 
Assume that each component has two states including failure and success, and 
component outages are independent of each other. Let si represents the state of the ith 
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component and Qi its failure probability. Produce a random number Ri  following a 
uniform distribution between [0, 1] for the ith component:  
𝑠𝑖 = {
0                 (𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)                             𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖 > 𝑄𝑖
1                  (𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒)                     𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑅𝑖 ≤ 𝑄𝑖
                   (3.72) 
The state of the system containing N components is represented by the vector s: 
𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑖, … , 𝑠𝑁)                                                   (3.73) 
After selecting a system state in the sampling, the system analysis is conducted to 
determine whether it is a failure state or not, and a risk index for that state would be 
assessed. 
When the number of samples, M, is sufficiently large, the sampling frequency 
of the system state s can be used as an unbiased estimation of its probability: 
𝑃(𝑠) =
𝑚(𝑠)
𝑀
                                                           (3.74) 
where m(s) is the number of occurrences of the system state s in the sampling. The 
same formulas as those in Equations (3.65) to (3.71) can be used to calculate the 
system failure probability, failure frequency, mean system failure duration, and other 
risk indices. 
It is important to note that the Monte Carlo simulation is a fluctuating process. 
As a result, the estimated risk indices always come with a confidence band. Although 
this confidence band decreases as the number of samples increases, it cannot be 
guaranteed that a few more samples will definitely result in a smaller error. An 
appropriate convergence criterion is vital to assure the accuracy of a Monte Carlo 
simulation. The coefficient of variance is often used as the stopping rule in the 
sampling process. Another approach is to determine a maximum number of samples 
as the stopping rule.  
The state sampling not only applies to random component outages but also can 
be used to sample the states for other uncertain factors in power system risk 
evaluation such as load levels, intermittent generation, and weather states. Compared 
to the state enumeration, the nonsequential Monte Carlo approach is more preferable 
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when a large system or a system with high failure probabilities of components is 
studied. However, similar to the state enumeration techniques, the state sampling 
method cannot model time-dependent events 
3.4.7 Sequential Monte Carlo simulation [68] 
Sequential Monte Carlo approach refers to a simulation process over a 
chronological time span. It is often called the state duration sampling. It is based on 
sampling a probability distribution of component state duration and contains 5 steps: 
1. Step 1: Specify initial states of all components. Typically, they are assumed 
to be in the up state initially. 
2. Step 2: Sample the duration of each component residing in its present state. 
The probability distribution of the state duration should be assumed. For 
example, the sampling value of the state duration distributed exponentially is 
given by 
𝐷𝑖 =
1
𝜆𝑖
ln 𝑅𝑖                                                   (3.75) 
where 𝑅𝑖 is a random number between [0,1] following a uniform distribution 
corresponding to the ith component. 𝜆𝑖 is either the failure rate of the ith 
component if the present state is up, or the repair rate if the present state is 
down. 
3. Repeat Step 2 in the considered time span and record sampling values of 
each state duration for all components. The chronological state transition 
processes of each component in the given time span can be obtained as 
shown in Fig. 3.14. 
4. Step 4: Create the chronological system state transition cycle by combining 
the state transition processes of all components as shown in Fig. 3.15. 
5. Step 5: Perform the system analysis for each system state to calculate the 
risk indices. Equations (3.76) to (3.78) are the three general formulas of the 
risk indices: 
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𝑃𝑓 =
∑ 𝐷𝑑𝑘
𝑀𝑑𝑛
𝑘=1
∑ 𝐷𝑑𝑘
𝑀𝑑𝑛
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑗
𝑀𝑢𝑝
𝑗=1
                                       (3.76) 
𝐹𝑓 =
𝑀𝑑𝑛
∑ 𝐷𝑑𝑘
𝑀𝑑𝑛
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑗
𝑀𝑢𝑝
𝑗=1
                                       (3.77) 
𝐷𝑓 =
∑ 𝐷𝑑𝑘
𝑀𝑑𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑀𝑑𝑛
                                               (3.77) 
where 𝑃𝑓, 𝐹𝑓, and 𝐷𝑓 are the system failure probability, frequency, and mean 
duration, respectively; 𝐷𝑑𝑘 is the duration in the kth down state and 𝐷𝑢𝑗 is 
the duration in the jth up state; 𝑀𝑑𝑛 and 𝑀𝑢𝑝 are the numbers of occurrences 
of system failure and success states. Generally these two numbers are the 
same. 
 
Fig. 3.14. Chronological state transition processes of components. 
Similar to nonsequential Monte Carlo simulation, the sequential approach is a 
fluctuating process, and hence an appropriate convergence criterion is required such 
as the coefficient of variance rule. The main advantages of the state duration sampling 
are accurate evaluation of frequency and duration indices, flexibility of modelling any 
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state-duration distribution, and the capacity to calculate statistical probability 
distributions of system risk indices. The main disadvantage on the sequential Monte 
Carlo approach is high computational capacity.  
 
Fig. 3.15. Chronological system state transition process. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the basic elements of power system risk assessment 
including the evaluation procedure, the component outage models, the fundamental 
methods used in the risk assessment. There are three steps in a power system risk 
assessment. The first step in system risk evaluation is to develop component outage 
models and then calculate the probabilities of these events. The second step is to 
select system failure states and calculate their probabilities. The last step is to conduct 
the analysis for system failure states, evaluate their consequences, and then calculate 
risk indices. 
The failure models of system components are the vital part of power system risk 
assessment. They are classified into two categories: the independent and dependent 
outages. In the former one, the two-state, repairable forced-outage model is of the 
most importance and has been extensively used in the risk evaluation. The semi-
forced outage concept is based on actual conditions such as transformer with oil 
leakage. It is often represented using a three-state model. A planned outage can be 
modelled using two modelling methods. For short-term operation planning, it is often 
represented using a simplified two-state model similar to a repairable forced outage. 
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The partial failure concept is also considered to represent the derated states of 
generating units. In the dependent outages, the most popular one is the common-cause 
outage. There are two methods can be applied to model a common-cause outage. The 
first method is using a composite model which is theoretically approximate and 
requires relatively complex calculations. The second one is to use individual models 
which are not only much simpler but also more accurate compared to the composite 
model. The component-group and cascading outages are also addressed in this 
chapter.  
There are four fundamental methods that have been used in power system risk 
assessment. They are the probability convolution, series and parallel networks, 
Markov equations, and frequency-duration approaches. The four methods are often 
used for simple systems. For the risk evaluation of large-scale systems, two primary 
methods have been presented. They are state enumeration and Monte Carlo 
simulation. The former one is often used for systems with small number of 
components and/or low component outage probabilities. The latter one is further 
divided into nonsequential or state sampling and sequential or state duration sampling 
approaches. The Monte Carlo simulation method is preferable for large and complex 
systems with high failure probabilities of system components. 
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Chapter 4   
Risk Assessment for Operation Planning of Wind 
Integrated Power Systems 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a novel approach to quantitative risk evaluation of wind 
integrated power systems for short-term operation planning. Firstly, it introduces the 
risk evaluation techniques used in system operation planning. It then presents the 
probabilistic approach to assess the operation risk of a wind integrated power system 
taking into different system uncertainties. A case study is also performed to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. 
System operation planning studies are essential in maintaining and operating a 
reliable and secure power system. There is a fundamental difference between system 
development planning and operation planning. The former is associated with system 
reinforcement in a long time frame (years), whereas the latter is associated with 
operational measures in a short term usually less than 1 year. Long-term planners 
need to determine the necessary facilities and make a decision that is whether or not 
to strengthen the existing facilities to fulfil the system reliability criteria. In contrast, 
system operators need to identify the acceptable operating regions within which 
security criteria are met and make a decision that is whether or not to take actions to 
modify the operating conditions.  
The traditional approaches used in system operation planning are based on the 
deterministic principle. The deterministic criterion, normally N-1 criterion, requires 
that a power system must be able to withstand an outage of any single system 
component such as a generator, a transformer or a transmission line without violating 
any system operating limits. Some utilities also study a few N-2 or N-1-1 events in 
their operation planning. In recent decades, probabilistic risk assessment has become 
an important part of the operation planning studies. There are several reasons for this. 
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1. Any system, even if it satisfies the N-1 criterion, still has operational risk 
due to higher failure levels caused by multiple component outages. 
2. There are often a number of operation modes that all meet the deterministic 
criteria. It is necessary to identify the lowest-risk or the most economical 
operation mode. 
3. In recent years, large-scale integration of WPG significantly increases 
system variability and uncertainty due to wind intermittency and creates a 
number of technical challenges in the power system planning and operation. 
The deterministic criteria do not take into account the probabilistic nature of 
system behaviour, the uncertainty of demand and generation, and the 
probabilities of contingencies and network element failures. This may lead to 
results biased from reality and uneconomic decisions [7]. Probabilistic risk 
evaluation provides risk indices that take into account consequences of all 
possible failure operation states and probabilities of their occurrence. This is 
a valuable enhancement to the deterministic operation criteria.  
It is very important to appreciate that the introduction of probabilistic risk 
assessment into system operation planning is not to replace but to enhance the 
existing deterministic operation criteria.  
4.2 Risk evaluation in system operation planning 
Power systems are divided into three functional zones: generation, transmission, 
and distribution. Generation (or generation-demand) system risk evaluation is 
concerned with only generation facilities and is called the hierarchical level one 
(HL1) study. Both generation and transmission equipment are included in the 
hierarchical level 2 (HL2), whereas all the three function zones are considered in the 
hierarchical level 3 (HL3). In risk evaluation for system operation planning, the HL2 
will be studied. Depending on different requirements and study purposes, there are 
three possible cases in this risk assessment: 
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1. General cases: the failures of both generation and transmission components 
are considered. 
2. Transmission system risk evaluation: only the failures of transmission 
components are considered, whereas all generating units are assumed to be 
100% reliable. 
3. Generation system risk evaluation: only the failures of generating units are 
considered, whereas all transmission components are assumed to be 100% 
reliable. Please note that this case is different from the generation-demand 
system risk assessment since the constraints due to the transmission network 
such as transmission line loading constraints are still considered in the 
evaluation.  
4.2.1 Basic procedure 
Operation planning risk evaluation has four main aspects: determination of 
component outage and load curve models, selection of system operation states, 
identification and analysis of system problems, and calculation of risk indices. Both 
the state enumeration and Monte Carlo simulation approaches can be applied to the 
risk evaluation. The two approaches select system operation states and calculate 
operation risk indices differently but use the same techniques to identify and analyse 
operation problems in a system state. The basic procedure is shown in Fig. 4.1.  
4.2.2 Component outage models 
Generating units are represented using the two-state (up and down) or multiple-
state (including derated states) model. There might be several generators connected to 
one bus. If the Monte Carlo simulation is used, the states and state transitions of all 
generators can be directly sampled and hence no simplification is needed. If the state 
enumeration approach is used, to reduce the computational effort, a generation 
capacity probability table for each generation bus can be created. Instead of using the 
state probabilities of individual generators, the probabilities of generation capacity 
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levels in the table are enumerated. Or in other words, the generators on the same bus 
are aggregated into one generator with multiple generation levels.  
 
Fig. 4.1. Basic procedure of risk assessment for operation planning. 
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For example, consider a generation bus with two 30 MW and two 20 MW 
generating units which have the unavailability of 0.03 and 0.04, respectively. All the 
generation capacity levels with their probabilities are enumerated and shown in Table 
4.1. 
Table 4.1 Generation capacity and probability 
Capacity (MW) 
Probability 
Available Outage 
100 0 0.97×0.97×0.96×0.96 = 0.86713 
80 20 0.97×0.97×0.96×0.04×2 = 0.07226 
70 30 0.97×0.96×0.96×0.03×2 = 0.05363 
60 40 0.97×0.97×0.04×0.04 = 0.00150  
50 50 0.97×0.96×0.03×0.04×4 = 0.004470 
40 60 0.96×0.96×0.03×0.03 = 0.00083 
30 70 0.97×0.03×0.04×0.04×2 = 0.00009 
20 80 0.96×0.03×0.03×0.04×2 = 0.000069 
0 100 0.03×0.03×0.04×0.04 = 0.0000014 
 
Transmission components include overhead lines, cables, transformers, 
capacitors, and reactors. They are often represented by a two-state model (up and 
down). The common-cause outage model is used for overhead lines on the same right 
of way or a set of components controlled by the same protection logic. The tap-
connection structure in a transmission line is represented by a component-group 
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outage model. For details of the component outage models, please refer to        
Section 3.3. 
4.2.3 Load curve models 
If the state enumeration or nonsequential Monte Carlo approach is applied, a 
non-chronological load duration curve is used. If the sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation is used, a chronological load curve is utilised. There are three types of load 
model: 
1. A single load curve is considered and loads at all buses are scaled 
proportionally to follow the shape of the considered load curve. A multiple-
step model can be created to represent the load duration curve such as the 
one shown in Fig. 4.2. 
 
Fig. 4.2. Multiple-step model for a load duration curve [11]. 
2. Loads at some buses do not change such as an industrial customer with the 
same power demand every hour, whereas other bus loads follow a load 
curve. 
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3. Loads are classified into different bus groups with varied load curves. In this 
case, several load duration curves have to be included and each curve 
represents a bus group. The multiple step load model has to capture the 
correlation between all the load curves. 
4.2.4 Contingency analysis 
The contingency analysis for generating units is straightforward. If the 
remaining generation capacity at each generation bus can compensate the unavailable 
capacity due to loss of generator(s) at the same bus, load curtailment is not required. 
Otherwise, a generation rescheduling should be carried out. However, if dynamic 
phenomena are considered such as frequency deviations caused by load-generation 
balance, the analysis will be much more complex. 
The contingency analysis for transmission components is more complex. The 
purpose is to calculate line loading levels and bus voltages following one or more 
component outages, and identify if there is any line overloading, voltage violation, or 
isolated bus. There are two basic transmission contingency analysis approaches: AC 
power-flow-based sensitivity technique and DC power-flow-based contingency 
analysis. 
4.2.5 State enumeration method 
State enumeration method is often used for power systems with low component 
failure probabilities. The basic concept of the state enumeration method has been 
described in Section 3.4.5. In the state enumeration approach, the probability of a 
system operation state is given by 
𝑃(𝑠) =∏𝑃𝐹𝑖
𝑛𝑑
𝑖=1
∏𝑃𝑃𝑖
𝑛𝑟
𝑖=1
∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐹𝑖 −
𝑛−𝑛𝑑−𝑛𝑟
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑃𝑖)                        (4.1) 
where 𝑛𝑑 and 𝑛𝑟 are the numbers of components unavailable (down state) and 
partially unavailable (derated state) in the operation state s; n is the total number of 
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components in the system; 𝑃𝐹𝑖 is the outage probability of component i; and 𝑃𝑃𝑖 is 
the probability of component i in the derated state. 
Some common risk indices used in the state enumeration method for operation 
planning risk assessment are shown as follows: 
1. Probability of load curtailment (PLC): 
𝑃𝐿𝐶 =∑(∑𝑃(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝐹𝑖
)
𝑇𝑖
𝑇
𝑁𝐿
𝑖=1
                                               (4.2) 
where 𝑃(𝑠) is the probability of state s; 𝐹𝑖 is the set of all the failure system 
states at the ith load level in the multiple-step load model; 𝑇𝑖 is the time 
length (in hours) of the ith load level; 𝑁𝐿 is the number of load levels; 𝑇 is 
the total time period of the load curve (in hours), it can be hours, days, weeks 
or months for operation planning. 
2. Expected frequency of load curtailment (EFLC – failures/period): 
𝐸𝐹𝐿𝐶 =∑∑(𝑃(𝑠) ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑚(𝑠)
𝑗=1
)
𝑠∈𝐹𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑇
𝑁𝐿
𝑖=1
                                       (4.3) 
where 𝜆𝑗 is the jth departure rate of the components in state s; m(s) is the 
total number of the transition rates departing from state s. 
3. Expected energy not supplied (EENS – MWh/period): 
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑆 =∑(∑𝑃(𝑠) × 𝐶(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝐹𝑖
)𝑇𝑖
𝑁𝐿
𝑖=1
                                       (4.4) 
where 𝐶(𝑠) is load curtailment (MW) in state s. 
All the three indices can be used for individual buses, areas, or the overall 
system.  
4.2.6 Nonsequential Monte Carlo method 
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The nonsequential Monte Carlo method is often used in complex power 
systems. The basic concept of the state sampling approach is described in         
Section 3.4.6. Selecting a system operation state using the state sampling approach is 
associated with random determination of bus loads and component states. Random 
variables following a normal distribution are used to capture uncertainties of bus 
loads, whereas random variables distributed uniformly represent component states 
(up, down, or derated). The risk indices are calculated as follows: 
1. Probability of load curtailment: 
𝑃𝐿𝐶 =∑(∑
𝑛(𝑠)
𝑁𝑖
𝑠∈𝐹𝑖
)
𝑇𝑖
𝑇
𝑁𝐿
𝑖=1
                                               (4.5) 
where 𝑛(𝑠) is the number of occurrences of state s in the sampling; 𝑁𝑖 is the 
total number of samples; 𝐹𝑖 is the set of all the failure system states at the ith 
load level in the multiple-step load model; 𝑇𝑖 is the time length (in hours) of 
the ith load level; 𝑁𝐿 is the number of load levels; 𝑇 is the total time period 
of the load curve (in hours), it can be hours, days, weeks or months for 
operation planning. 
2. Expected frequency of load curtailment (failures/period): 
𝐸𝐹𝐿𝐶 =∑∑(
𝑛(𝑠)
𝑁𝑖
∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑚(𝑠)
𝑗=1
)
𝑠∈𝐹𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑇
𝑁𝐿
𝑖=1
                                       (4.6) 
where 𝜆𝑗 is the jth departure rate of the components in state s; m(s) is the 
total number of the transition rates departing from state s. 
3. Expected energy not supplied (MWh/period): 
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑆 =∑(∑
𝑛(𝑠)
𝑁𝑖
× 𝐶(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝐹𝑖
)𝑇𝑖
𝑁𝐿
𝑖=1
                                       (4.7) 
where 𝐶(𝑠) is load curtailment (MW) in state s. 
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It can be seen from Equations (4.2) to (4.7) that the difference between the 
formulas for the risk indices in the state enumeration and nonsequential Monte Carlo 
approaches is the estimation of the system operation state probabilities.  
4.3 Proposed risk assessment approach for operation planning 
of wind integrated power systems 
Recent global trend indicates a rapid growth in grid-connected renewable 
generation particularly wind energy in the coming decades. However, planning and 
operating a power system with high wind penetration face a number of technical 
challenges due to variability and uncertainty associated with wind. Wind energy 
conversion systems cannot be scheduled and dispatched in the traditional way. They 
also regulate their output and react to grid changes such as voltage or frequency 
disturbances differently compared with conventional synchronous generators. 
Moreover, the correlation between WPG output and load may be negative due to the 
variable nature of wind. Wind generation forecast also introduces an additional 
uncertainty factor to the system. As a result, in order to analyse a power system with 
significant wind generation, it is necessary to take into account the uncertainty of 
WPG. 
4.3.1 Risk index 
To perform power system risk assessments, a risk index needs to be defined.  
Since risk refers to “the effect of uncertainty on objective” and “is often expressed in 
terms of a combination of the consequences of an event and the associated likelihood 
of occurrence” [6], a risk index can be defined as the sum of products of probabilities 
and quantified consequences as shown below [7]: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  ∑∑𝑃(𝐶𝑖) × 𝑃(𝑆𝑗) × 𝑄(𝐶𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)
𝑖𝑗
                                  (4.8) 
where 𝑃(𝐶𝑖) is the probability of the ith contingency 𝐶𝑖; 𝑃(𝑆𝑗) is the probability of 
system operating condition 𝑆𝑗; and 𝑄(𝐶𝑖, 𝑆𝑗) is the quantified consequence of the 
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contingency 𝐶𝑖 in the operating condition 𝑆𝑗. An operating condition includes 
different components, such as load and generation levels, network configuration, and 
possible operation measures. Some components are random with a specified 
probability distribution. The probability of the operating condition is based on the 
probability distribution of these components. The quantified consequence can be 
determined as the amounts of limit violation, load curtailments, or socio-economic 
losses due to contingencies, depending on the purpose of the risk assessment [7]. 
Equation (4.8) is a generic representation of the risk index.  This equation can 
be used for both the evaluation of the real-time operational risk and operational 
planning. In this paper, the risk assessment method is proposed for operational 
planning. Therefore, in calculating probabilities of contingencies and operating 
conditions, initial conditions are assumed known (a component is assumed 
operational in initial condition; it may fail in the future with the probability as a 
function of the lead time). 
System operational risks at a given time t in the planning period are estimated 
by summing the products of probabilities and quantified consequences of possible 
contingencies and operating conditions in this time period. The details of this 
estimation are presented in the following sections. 
4.3.2 Contingency probability 
Random contingencies caused by outages of system components such as 
generators, transformers and transmission lines are unavoidable and uncontrollable in 
power system operation. They represent the main causes of the system operational 
risks. The probabilities of these events depend on several factors including weather 
conditions, environment, equipment age, and operating conditions.  
To calculate the event probabilities, we assume that the failure/repair cycle of a 
single unit is represented by a two-state Markov model and its transitions follow an 
exponential probability distribution. Thus, the probability of failure of a single unit 
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during a time period T, given that the repair process is neglected, can be determined 
by [66]: 
𝑃 = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑇                                                       (4.9) 
where λ is the failure rate of the given unit. For short time period of up to several 
hours λT ≪ 1,  then Equation (4.9) becomes P ≈ λT, which is known as outage 
replacement rate (ORR) representing the probability that a unit fails and is not 
replaced during the time period T [66]. The probability of a random contingency 
P(Ci) in Equation (4.8) is determined by Equation (4.9).  
4.3.3 Wind forecast uncertainty 
Due to the intermittent nature of wind, predicting WPG output accurately on the 
time scale of interest (e.g., hourly, daily) represents a real challenge for power system 
planners and operators. There are various factors contributing to WPG forecast errors 
such as the forecast accuracy of individual wind plant outputs and the correlation 
between different wind farms. WPG output also depends on atmospheric factors such 
as wind speed and direction, or air density which are hard to predict accurately. The 
uncertainty in WPG forecasts can be relatively large, resulting in significant impacts 
on the reliability, security, and economic performance of wind integrated power 
systems. 
The forecast horizon will have a significant impact on the WPG forecast error. 
For very short time scales (e.g., seconds to minutes), wind variation and forecast error 
is small given that there is significant diversity in WPG output. Larger time scales 
from minutes to several hours can lead to higher forecast errors due to the higher 
probability of WPG output changes for longer forecast horizon [70], [71]. Fig. 4.3 
shows the probability density function of wind forecast errors over four different time 
scales (from half an hour to 4 hours). These errors are obtained using a sample of 
wind historical data in the UK and persistence based forecast techniques [72]. The 
forecast errors of WPG output are expressed as percentages of the total installed wind 
capacity. 
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Fig. 4.3. Forecast errors of WPG output over different forecast time horizon [69]. 
As can be seen in Fig. 4.3, the variance and/or standard deviation of the WPG 
forecast error increases remarkably with the forecast horizon. The probability density 
functions of WPG forecast errors have the form of a “Bell-shaped curve” but with 
thicker “tail” than normal distribution. 
However, for simple illustration purpose it is assumed in this thesis that WPG 
forecast errors can be modelled as a zero-mean normally-distributed random variable 
[52]. The WPG output at time t, 𝑤𝑝𝑡, is the sum of the forecast wind generation, 𝑤𝑝𝑓
𝑡 , 
and the forecast error, 𝜀𝑤𝑝
𝑡 . The standard deviation, 𝜎𝑤𝑝
𝑡 , is given by [73]: 
𝜎𝑤𝑝
𝑡 = (𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑤𝑝𝑓
𝑡)𝑊𝑃𝐼                                                    (4.10) 
where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are forecast parameters depending on the forecast horizon and the size 
of the region where wind farms are located, 𝑤𝑝𝑓 is the forecast output of wind 
generation in per unit, and 𝑊𝑃𝐼 is the total installed WPG capacity. Although in 
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practice, statistical data show that the WPG prediction errors do not fit a normal 
distribution [60], [72], this assumption can be justified by the invocation of the 
central limit theorem due to the large number and geographical dispersion of wind 
turbines [52]. Moreover, although the normal distribution is used in this work to 
represent WPG forecast errors, other probability distribution models can be applied. 
4.3.4 Load forecast uncertainty 
Similarly, the load forecast error is represented as a zero-mean normally-
distributed random variable. The load level at time t, 𝑙𝑡 is the sum of the forecast 
load, 𝑙𝑓
𝑡 , and the forecast error, 𝜀𝑙
𝑡. The standard deviation of load forecast error, 𝜎𝑙
𝑡, is 
given by [58]: 
𝜎𝑙
𝑡 =
𝑎
100
𝑙𝑓
𝑡                                                                  (4.11) 
where a is the constant representing the load forecast accuracy. 
In addition, to reduce computation time, instead of using the continuous normal 
probability distribution, the typical seven-interval discretization of the zero-mean 
continuous normal-distributed function shown in Fig. 4.4 is used. This is a discrete 
distribution made up of seven one-standard-deviation-wide slices. The discrete 
probabilities of this approximation are given in Table 4.2.  
Both load and WPG forecast errors are considered in calculating the probability 
of an operation condition 𝑃(𝑆𝑗) in Equation (4.8). At a given time t, there are seven 
possible load levels and seven possible WPG output levels. Their probabilities are: 
{
𝑃(𝑙𝑖
𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑙𝑓,𝑖
𝑡 + 𝜀𝑙,𝑖
𝑡 ) = 𝑃(𝜀𝑖) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 =  1, . . . ,7
𝑃(𝑤𝑝𝑗
𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑤𝑝𝑓,𝑗
𝑡 + 𝜀𝑤𝑝,𝑗
𝑡 ) = 𝑃(𝜀𝑗) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 =  1, . . . ,7
                       (4.12) 
As a result, there are forty-nine possible operating conditions at time t and their 
probabilities are: 
𝑃(𝑆𝑖,𝑗
𝑡 ) = 𝑃(𝑙𝑖
𝑡) × 𝑃(𝑤𝑝𝑗
𝑡)             𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖, 𝑗 =  1, . . . ,7                  (4.13) 
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Table 4.2. Discrete probabilities of seven-interval representation of forecast errors 
Forecast error Probability 
ε1 -3σ 0.0062 
ε2 -2σ 0.0606 
ε3 -1σ 0.2417 
ε4 0σ 0.383 
ε5 1σ 0.2417 
ε6 2σ 0.0606 
ε7 3σ 0.0062 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Discrete seven-interval representation of normal. 
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4.3.5 Quantifying the consequence of a contingency in an operation 
state 
The consequence of a contingency in an operating condition is quantified by the 
amount of expected load interruption cost (ELIC), which is the product of the unit 
interruption cost (UIC) or the value of lost load (VoLL) in $/kWh and the EENS. The 
unit interruption cost can be estimated by several methods [74] including: 
1. Method based on customer damage functions obtained from customer 
surveys and relevant statistical analysis. For example, the average UIC in 
Canada is from $4/kWh to $10/kWh [11], whereas $12.5/kWh – the market 
price cap (MPC) is used as the unit interruption cost in reliability studies in 
Australia [75]. This is the average social damage cost due to the interruption 
of power supply. It is very important to admit that the UIC is region-, 
country-, and system-specific. 
2. Method based on capital investments. For a power system utility, any capital 
investment for system reinforcement improves system reliability. In other 
words, there is a quantifiable relationship between the capital investment and 
the system risk. Therefore, the average unit interruption cost can be obtained. 
3. Method based on gross domestic product (GDP). The GDP for a region or 
country divided by the total annual electric energy consumption of the region 
or country results in a dollar value per kWh. This number reflects the 
average economic damage cost due to loss of 1 kWh electrical power in that 
region or country. 
The EENS is estimated based on the amount of load curtailments to clear post-
disturbance system security violations including steady-state voltage and line 
overload violations and frequency response inadequacy (FRI). This estimation is done 
using the heuristic load restoration process presented in [42]. It consists of two 
phases: 
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1. The control phase: is the period for the operator to perform corrective actions 
to try to bring the system back to a stabilised state and to decide a restoration 
strategy. 
2. The load restoration phase: involves the reconnection of the load that was 
interrupted. 
The duration of the first phase, 𝑡1, is calculated as follows: 
𝑡1 = 𝑇 ×
𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
𝑃𝑇
                                                     (4.14) 
where T is the expected duration of this first phase for a total system blackout 
(assumed to be 30 minutes based on the French blackout of 19 December 1978); 
𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 and 𝑃𝑇 are the interrupted and the total load of the system, respectively. The 
second phase is estimated using the load restoration rates given in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Load restoration rates 
Time period min 
Restoring rate 
MW/min 
0-30 10.0 
30-60 33.3 
60-90 66.6 
>90 83.3 
 
To quantify the consequences of the steady-state security violations including 
violated voltage constraints and equipment overload after a contingency occurs, the 
post-disturbance system condition is checked via power flow solutions. If any 
equipment such as a transmission line or a transformer is overloaded and/or voltage at 
any bus is out of the allowable range, the load located at or near the violated element 
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is disconnected in small blocks until these violations are cleared. In practice, these 
system violations can be solved by various corrective actions such as generation re-
scheduling, distribution network re-configuration, and dynamic line ratings. In fact, 
load shedding is used only as the last resort. However, because a general indicator is 
needed to quantify the consequence of a system contingency, load shedding is 
commonly used in probabilistic benchmarking studies [40]. 
To quantify consequences of the frequency response inadequacy, instead of 
using dynamic simulations we propose an analytical method. Firstly, a mathematical 
model is developed to approximately represent frequency trajectories during 
frequency excursion events. Secondly, using the developed frequency trajectories, we 
determine consequences of the frequency events in terms of load curtailments. By 
using this analytical method, the frequency response adequacy assessment can be run 
simultaneously with the steady-state voltage and overload evaluations. The detail of 
this analytical method will be presented in the next chapter. 
Fig. 4.5 shows the flow chart illustrating how the system operation risk given 
by is calculated for each operating point in our study. As discussed above, load 
shedding is the only corrective action which has been considered. 
4.4 Case study 
4.4.1 Case description 
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed risk assessment method it is 
applied to a nine-bus power system shown in Fig. 4.6. The model represents a power 
system with characteristics similar to the Tasmanian power system. The Tasmanian 
system is connected to the main Australian power network via a single monopolar 
HVDC link with a capacity to export 630 MW from and import 480 MW to 
Tasmania. The total installed generation capacity of the system is 2.9 GW with 2.2 
GW of hydro, 400 MW of gas, and 300 MW of wind generation. The power demand 
in Tasmania is approximately in the range of 800-1700 MW [76]. 
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Fig. 4.5. Risk calculation flow chart. 
Data of the nine-bus system are shown in Table 4.4. It has nine buses, six 
double circuit transmission lines, three single circuit lines and 17 conventional 
generating units with the same capacity of 150 MW. There are two wind farms 
connected to Bus 2 and Bus 9, respectively, with the installed capacity of 150 MW 
each. The system load is between 900 MW and 1800 MW. The system also has an 
interconnection line to an external grid with a capacity of 600 MW exporting and 450 
MW importing.  
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Fig. 4.6. The nine-bus power system. 
A number of system operation planning studies using the proposed risk 
assessment method are performed for six consecutive hours with varying system 
conditions and wind generation levels. Load and WPG hourly forecast data are given 
in Table 4.5. Load forecast errors are given by Equation (4.11) with a = 1. Wind 
generation forecast errors are given by Equation (4.10) with 𝛼 = 0.01 and 𝛽 = 0.16 
based on the data of one-hour WPG forecast in a region with a diameter of 360 km 
[73]. In the case study, it is assumed that the wind conditions at both wind farms are 
the same at any given time interval.  This assumption is usually valid for 
geographically small power systems, such as the Tasmanian system, that display little 
or no diversity between locations.  However, the proposed method can easily be 
adopted for cases when wind farms are far away from each other and have different 
wind conditions. 
The contingencies considered in the planning studies include: 
 outage of a single conventional generator; 
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 outage of a single wind farm; 
 outage of a single circuit (i.e., one circuit of a double circuit line or a single 
circuit line); and 
 outage of both circuits of a double circuit line. 
 
 
The contingency probabilities are calculated as explained in Section 4.3.2. The 
outage replacement rates of the system components are calculated from the reliability 
Table 4.4 System data 
Bus 
Conventional generation 
(MW) 
Wind generation 
(MW) 
Maximum load 
(MW) 
1 600 0 75 
2 300 150 240 
3 300 0 450 
4 600 0 360 
5 150 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
7 300 0 420 
8 150 0 45 
9 150 150 210 
Total 2550 300 1800 
 
Table 4.5 Hourly load and WPG forecast data for the next six hours 
Time t (h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Load (MW) 1000 1400 1600 1600 1800 1200 
WPG (p.u.) 0.6 0.8 0.6 0 0.2 0.5 
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data of the Tasmanian power network provided by Transend Networks. Security 
violations caused by random contingencies and forecast errors are line overloads and 
frequency response inadequacy (no voltage violations have been recorded in the 
studies).  
In this study, it is assumed that the secondary and tertiary reserves are sufficient 
to restore the frequency back to its nominal value and hence, we consider only the 
system primary frequency control capability when evaluating frequency response 
inadequacy risks. There are three under-frequency relay settings for the period of the 
primary control, as shown in Table 4.6 (the nominal frequency is 50 Hz). 
 
These settings are similar to the automatic under-frequency load shedding 
configuration used in [77]. The system primary reserve is set at 150 MW that is the 
size of the largest generator.  It will be activated once the system frequency drops 
below 49.85 Hz and takes 6 seconds to reach its maximum value of 150 MW. This is 
similar to the fast (R6) rise frequency control response in Australia [78]. The load 
relief factor k = 1. The system aggregate effective inertia is the sum of the inertia of 
all online generating units. All conventional generators have the same effective inertia 
of 750 MWs. It is assumed that the system load does not contribute to the system 
aggregate inertia. The wind generators are connected to the grid via electronic 
converters and hence, are also assumed to provide no inertial response. 
The unit interruption cost is $12.5/kWh, which is the MPC often used in 
reliability studies in Australia [75]. The simulations (stead-state power flow 
calculations) were conducted using DIgSILENT PowerFactory. The simulation 
Table 4.6 Under frequency relay setting 
Relay 
Load 
shedding 
block size (%) 
Frequency 
threshold 1 
(Hz) 
Time 
delay 1 
(s) 
Frequency 
threshold 2 
(Hz) 
Time 
delay 2 
(s) 
1 10 47.8 0.2 - - 
2 10 47.5 0.2 47.8 10 
3 10 47.2 0.2 47.5 2 
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procedure follows the flow chart shown in Fig. 4.5. The state enumeration approach is 
used to select system operation states and calculate the risk index. Generation-load 
imbalances are taken care by the generator inertial and governor responses. 
4.4.2 Result evaluation 
4.4.2.1 Risk-based operation planning 
We first investigate the operational risks in the planning hours assuming the 
system operates in the islanding mode (the interconnection flow is 0). The operational 
risks are shown in Fig. 4.7. As can be seen, the overload risks are almost zero in the 
planning period except at time interval t = 5 when the system load reaches its 
maximum value of 1800 MW. In the meantime, the operational risks associated with 
frequency response inadequacy are very high during time intervals t = 1 and t = 2, but 
are reduced considerably in the subsequent four hours. It indicates that the FRI risks 
are high under low demand and high wind generation conditions. This can be 
explained by the fact that when the load level is low and the wind generation is high, 
the number of online conventional generators is small and hence, the system inertia is 
reduced, which, in turn, makes the system more vulnerable to frequency deviations. 
In addition, when the wind generation output is high, the wind forecast error also 
increases, as shown in Equation (4.10), leading to larger load-generation imbalances, 
which are the main causes of FRI risks. 
We now examine how the proposed risk assessment method can assist system 
operators in their operation planning studies. For example, let us consider the 
operation planning study for the system at time interval t = 2 (Fig. 4.7). The goal is to 
determine limits for the interconnection power flow and required levels of wind 
power curtailment so that the operational risk remains below a certain threshold. 
Wind power generation is often considered as non-scheduled generation and 
modelled as negative loads. However, high penetration of WPG may result in the 
WPG curtailment under some conditions in order to prevent violations of operation 
constraints [79]. In Australia, from 2008 large intermittent generators such as wind 
farms, which have generating capacity equal or larger than 30 MW, must be classified 
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as semi-scheduled generators; they are required to participate in the central dispatch 
process. In some dispatch intervals, semi-scheduled generators are required to limit 
their output to a level below the dispatch level based on constraints in the central 
dispatch process [80]. 
 
Fig. 4.7. Operational risks associated with the loss of the interconnection link. 
Fig. 4.8 shows the operational risk contours at time interval t = 2 with different 
interconnection flows and WPG outputs. Each contour represents a set of operating 
points, which have the same value of operational risks, FRI risks in Fig. 4.8(a) and 
overload risks in Fig. 4.8(b), respectively. As can be seen, when the interconnection 
flow is zero and WPG is 0.8 p.u., the FRI risk is $200 and the overload risk is almost 
zero; this is consistent with the results shown in Fig. 4.7 for time interval t = 2. If the 
risk threshold of $100 (in terms of expected load interruption cost) is chosen as the 
maximum allowable FRI risk for operation in the planning period, the wind 
generation output must be curtailed to 0.67 p.u. and the interconnection power flow 
must be set within the range between -150 MW (the negative sign indicates that the 
interconnection operates in the exporting mode) to 0 MW. 
Chapter 4 : Risk Assessment for Operation Planning of Wind Integrated Power 
Systems 
 
- 75 - 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 4.8. Operational risk contours at time interval t = 2. (a) FRI risks. (b) Overload 
risks. (Negative values of interconnection flow indicate exporting and positive values 
indicate importing). 
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If we want to operate at a full range of the interconnection power flow (from -
600 MW to 450 MW), the wind generation output must be further curtailed to 0.52 
p.u., as can be seen in Fig. 4.8(a). If the same risk threshold applies to overload risks, 
the interconnection power flow must be limited to -500 MW at maximum wind 
generation output (0.8 p.u.), as shown in Fig. 4.8(b). Fig. 4.8 also shows that the wind 
generation level affects the FRI risk significantly, but has little impact on the overload 
risk. In contrast, the interconnection power flow has large effect on the risk of 
overload. It should be noted that the risk threshold is based on a management 
decision. It is system-specific and depends on the criteria system operators use in 
their decision-making process. The risk threshold can vary under different operating 
conditions and time intervals in the same system. 
4.4.2.2 Impact of the increasing WPG on operational risks  
To evaluate the impact of increasing WPG penetration on the system 
operational risks, two additional wind farms with the installed capacity of 100 MW 
each are connected to Bus 7. These two wind farms are assumed to have the same 
outage replacement rate and wind speed conditions at any time interval as the other 
two farms connected to Bus 2 and Bus 9, respectively. Fig. 4.9 compares the system 
operational risks at time interval t = 3 with two wind generation scenarios: 300 MW 
(two wind farms – solid curves) and 500 MW (four wind farms – dash curves). As 
can be seen, in the 300 MW scenario, when the interconnection flow is zero, the FRI 
and overload risks are around $44 and $14, respectively. These values are consistent 
with the results shown in Fig. 4.7 for time interval t = 3. In addition, Fig. 4.9 
demonstrates that the increased wind penetration leads to a significant increase in FRI 
risks, but a slight decrease in overload risks. The reason is that the higher the wind 
penetration, the higher the WPG forecasting errors, which result in a larger 
generation-load mismatch and hence, higher FRI risks. Meanwhile, due to the 
increased wind generation capacity, local loads are more likely to be supplied by local 
generators, and therefore the loading of transmission lines is likely to reduce. 
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Fig. 4.9. Operational risks at time t = 3 when the installed wind generation capacity 
increases from 300 MW to 500 MW. 
4.4.2.3 Frequency response inadequacy risk and primary reserves 
As can be seen from the results in the previous sections, the FRI risk is 
considerably large, especially when the load level is low and the wind generation 
output is high, or the installed WPG capacity increases. This indicates that 150 MW 
of primary reserve, which is equal to the size of the largest generator, is not sufficient 
to deal with possible generation-load mismatches caused by either forecast errors or 
the loss of a generating unit, or both. In recent years, several authors from both 
industry and academia stated that operating reserve requirements need to be set 
dynamically to cope better with the uncertain characteristics of a power system 
including wind generation uncertainty [52, 58, 60]. It is generally agreed that large 
integration of WPG will result in an increase in the required amount of operating 
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reserves to maintain system reliability. However, the cost of providing reserves is far 
from negligible and should be taken into account when determining the reserve 
requirements [58]. The risk assessment approach proposed in this paper can assist a 
system operator in determining reserve requirements dynamically.  
As an example, let us consider the system with different levels of primary 
reserves at time interval t = 2 (Fig. 4.7).  The power exchanged through the 
interconnection link is set to zero. We define the expected operation cost as the sum 
of the FRI risk and the cost of providing the reserve. The amount of primary reserve 
needs to be determined to achieve the minimum expected operation cost. Fig. 4.10 
shows the FRI risks and the expected operation costs with two different reserve 
prices. As can be seen, the minimum operation cost is $200 approximately with 200 
MW of reserve and $0.87/MWh reserve cost, while it is $580 with 180 MW of 
reserve and $2.81/MWh reserve cost. 
 
Fig. 4.10. FRI risks and estimated operation costs at time t = 2 with different primary 
reserve amount. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a novel approach to quantitative risk evaluation of wind 
integrated power systems for short-term operation planning. A risk index representing 
both the likelihood and consequences of contingencies as well as system uncertainties 
caused by WPG and load forecasting errors was used to assess the system operation 
risk. The consequences of system failures were estimated using expected load 
interruption costs. 
In the case study presented, the proposed approach was used to evaluate the 
operation risk of the nine-bus power system with characteristics similar to the 
Tasmanian power network. The results showed that the integration of WPG 
significantly affected the system operation risk, especially risks associated with 
frequency response inadequacy. Impacts of different factors including load and WPG 
forecast uncertainties, wind power penetration levels, and operating reserves on the 
operation risk were investigated. It also showed that the proposed approach could 
assist system operators in operation planning decision making such as setting 
constraints for wind generation curtailments and determining operating reserves.  
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Chapter 5   
Development of Mathematical Model for System 
Frequency Responses 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the main tasks in a power system is to maintain the balance between the 
electrical power produced by generators and the power consumed by loads, including 
system loses. If for some reasons such as load changes or generation variations, this 
balance is not maintained, it will lead to a frequency excursion. A frequency drop 
could lead to large magnetizing currents in induction motors and transformers. Large 
frequency excursions may also have serious impacts on the power system operation 
and the reliability of power supply.  
This chapter presents the development of a mathematical model for system 
frequency trajectories in load-generation imbalance events which have been used in 
Chapter 4 to quantify system operation risk. Section 5.2 presents the fundamental 
dynamic model of frequency in an electrical power system. Section 5.3 presents an 
overview of power system frequency control. Section 5.4 shows the development of 
mathematical model for frequency dynamic taking into account the system frequency 
control services. Section 5.5 presents a number of case studies to validate the 
developed frequency models. Finally, some remarks are presented in Section 5.6 to 
conclude the chapter.  
5.2 Fundamental dynamic model of system frequency 
The swing equation of a rotating machine is [78] 
𝐽
𝑑𝜔
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑇𝑚 − 𝑇𝑒                                                       (5.1) 
where 
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J is the moment of inertia of the rotating machine 
𝜔 is the angular velocity 
𝑇𝑚 is the mechanical torque 
𝑇𝑒 is the electrical torque 
Please note that in the above equation, 𝑇𝑚 and 𝑇𝑒 are positive for generators and 
negative for motors. As the relation between power and torque is 
𝑃 = 𝜔𝑇                                                                  (5.2) 
Equation (5.1) can be rewritten as 
𝐽𝜔
𝑑𝜔
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑃𝑚 − 𝑃𝑒                                                         (5.3) 
where 
𝑃𝑚 is the mechanical power 
𝑃𝑒 is the electrical power 
For a rotating machine, inertia is often expressed by an inertia constant 𝐻 
defined as the kinetic energy at rated speed divided by the apparent power rating of 
the machine [78] 
𝐻 =
1
2
𝐽𝜔0
2
𝑆
                                                             (5.4) 
where 
𝜔0 is the rated angular velocity 
𝑆 is the apparent power rating 
The moment of inertia 𝐽 in terms of 𝐻 is 
𝐽 =
2𝐻
𝜔0
2 𝑆                                                              (5.5) 
Substituting Equation (5.5) into Equation (5.3) gives 
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2𝐻𝑆
𝜔0
2 𝜔
𝑑𝜔
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑃𝑚 − 𝑃𝑒                                                   (5.6) 
Equation (5.6) can be rewritten in terms of frequency instead of angular velocity. 
Substituting 𝜔 = 2𝜋𝑓 gives 
2𝐻𝑆
𝑓0
2 𝑓
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑃𝑚 − 𝑃𝑒                                                 (5.7) 
In order to obtain a linear approximation of Equation (5.7), we assume that 
𝑓
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓0
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
                                                        (5.8) 
This is a valid, widely accepted assumption for realistic frequency deviation in power 
systems [81, 82]. As a result 
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑓0
2𝐻𝑆
(𝑃𝑚 − 𝑃𝑒)                                                (5.9) 
A power system can be considered as a collection of generating units and loads, 
and a simplification can be made if it is assumed that power flows freely and 
instantaneously between them and the same system frequency occurs throughout the 
power system.  In practice, the combined effect of the interconnecting network and 
generating unit excitation system dynamics adds a small oscillatory component to the 
frequency trajectory, but this effect is ignored because it usually decays within a few 
seconds. Therefore, the fundamental frequency dynamics of the system can be 
described by the below equation 
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑓0
2∑𝐻𝑆
(∑𝑃𝑚 −∑𝑃𝑒) =
𝑓0
2∑𝐻𝑆
(𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐿𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙)            (5.10) 
where 
𝑓0 is the nominal system frequency 
∑𝐻𝑆 is the aggregate effective inertia of all generating units and motors in the 
power system 
∑𝑃𝑚 is the sum of all mechanical power, 
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∑𝑃𝑒 is the sum of all electrical power outputs 
𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total generation  
𝐿𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total load including network losses  
In general, both 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 and 𝐿𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 are functions of frequency and time. If the 
balance between generation and load is maintained, the system frequency will be kept 
constant at 𝑓0. When a disturbance occurs such as a loss of generator or a step change 
in load, there will be an imbalance between generation and load causing a frequency 
deviation. The system generation and load can be written as 
𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙(𝑓, 𝑡) = 𝐺0 + ∆𝐺(𝑓, 𝑡)
𝐿𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙(𝑓, 𝑡) = 𝐿0 + ∆𝐿(𝑓, 𝑡)
                                      (5.11) 
where 
𝐺0 and  𝐿0 are the generated power and load in steady state, respectively 
∆𝐺 and ∆𝐿 are the deviations in generation and load from the steady state 
values 
Since the system is in equilibrium prior to the disturbance, hence 
𝐺0 = 𝐿0                                                            (5.12) 
As a result, Equation (5.10) can be rewritten as 
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑓0
2∑𝐻𝑆
[∆𝐺(𝑓, 𝑡) − ∆𝐿(𝑓, 𝑡)]                                   (5.13) 
It is the fundamental dynamic model of the system frequency. 
5.3 Power system frequency control 
After a frequency deviation occurs, rotating machines in the power system 
immediately release their kinetic energy to arrest the change in frequency. This is 
called inertial responses. If the frequency exceeds its normal operating band, the 
primary frequency control will be activated to ensure that the frequency is maintained 
within its short-term acceptable operating limits [83]. The primary control is often 
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deployed within few seconds and provided by generator governor response and 
automatic disconnection of interruptible load. 
Secondary control is deployed through Automatic Generation Control (AGC) 
within tens of seconds to minutes after the frequency disturbance occurs. It takes care 
of the remaining frequency deviation and brings the frequency back to its nominal 
value. Tertiary control provided by fast start-up generators is later manually deployed 
to replace the secondary control or complement it if the secondary control reserves 
are not sufficient for restoring the frequency [84].  
If at any time the frequency goes out of the associated operating limits, 
additional measures such as automatic under frequency load shedding (UFLS) are 
carried out to bring the frequency back to its limits. The frequency control structure 
described above is illustrated in Fig. 5.1 and its time spans are shown in Fig. 5.2 [14]. 
 
Fig. 5.1. System frequency control structure. 
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Fig. 5.2. Time spans of frequency control. 
5.4 Development of mathematical models for frequency 
responses  
5.4.1 Load relief 
In a power system, a frequency dependency of the aggregated system load can 
be clearly observable. When the frequency decreases, motor loads connected to the 
power system will slow down. As the amount of power consumed by these machines 
is proportional to their rotational speed, the demand for power seen by the power 
system will thus fall as frequency falls. Other loads may also consume less power as 
the frequency decreases. Conversely, if the frequency increases, the power demand 
for power will increase. The change in demand for a given frequency deviation is thus 
related to the number of motors connected to the power system, and the size of the 
frequency deviation. This effect is called as “load relief” and has a stabilizing effect 
on the system frequency 𝑓. It can be described as follow 
∆𝐿 = 𝐿 − 𝐿0 = −𝑘𝐿0 (1 −
𝑓
𝑓0
)                                      (5.14) 
where 𝑘 is the load relief factor. Now we will consider the frequency dynamic model 
for common generation-load disturbances. 
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5.4.2 Frequency dynamic model for a loss of generation or load 
If a loss of generation “𝑔” occurs at time 𝑡 = 0, the frequency dynamic model 
is given by combining Equation (5.13) with 
∆𝐺 = −𝑔
∆𝐿 = −𝑘𝐿0(1 −
𝑓
𝑓0
)
                                               (5.15) 
we have 
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑓0
2∑𝐻𝑆
[−𝑔 + 𝑘𝐿0(1 −
𝑓
𝑓0
)]                                (5.16) 
This can be solved for variable t as 
𝑡 = −
2∑𝐻𝑆
𝑘𝐿0
ln [1 − (1 −
𝑓
𝑓0
)
𝑘𝐿0
𝑔
]                            (5.17) 
Equation (5.17) can then be solved for frequency as 
𝑓 = 𝑓0 [1 −
𝑔
𝑘𝐿0
(1 − 𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠)]         for 𝑡 ≥ 0                      (5.18) 
where 𝑇𝑠 is the system time constant given by 
𝑇𝑠 =
2∑𝐻𝑆
𝑘𝐿0
                                                     (5.19) 
Similarly, if a loss of load “𝑙” occurs at time 𝑡 = 0, the frequency dynamic 
model is given by 
𝑓 = 𝑓0 [1 +
𝑙
𝑘(𝐿0 − 𝑙)
(1 − 𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠)]         for 𝑡 ≥ 0                     (5.20) 
5.4.3 Frequency dynamic model for a ramp of generation 
If a ramp of generation starting at time 𝑡 = 0 and levelling at value “𝑟” at time 
𝑡 = 𝑡1 occurs, the frequency dynamic model is 
𝑑𝑓(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑓0
2∑𝐻𝑆
[𝑟(𝑡) + 𝑘𝐿0 (1 −
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑓0
)]                              (5.21) 
where 
Chapter 5 : Development of Mathematical Model for System Frequency Responses 
 
- 87 - 
 
𝑟(𝑡) =
𝑟
𝑡1
× [𝑡 × 𝑢(𝑡) − (𝑡 − 𝑡1) × 𝑢(𝑡 − 𝑡1)]                          (5.22) 
𝑢(𝑡) = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≤ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 0
                                             (5.23) 
Substituting Equation (5.19) into Equation (5.21) gives 
𝑇𝑠
𝑑𝑓(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑓0
𝑘𝐿0
× 𝑟(𝑡) + 𝑓0 − 𝑓(𝑡)                              (5.24) 
Using Laplace transform for Equations (5.22) and (5.24) we have 
𝑅(𝑠) =
{
 
 
𝑟
𝑡1
×
1
𝑠2
 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1
𝑟
𝑡1
× (1 − 𝑒−𝑡1𝑠) ×
1
𝑠2
 𝑖𝑓 𝑡1 < 𝑡
                           (5.25) 
𝑇𝑠(𝑠𝐹(𝑠) − 𝑓0) =
𝑓0
𝑘𝐿0
× 𝑅(𝑠) +
𝑓0
𝑠
− 𝐹(𝑠)                        (5.26) 
Equation (5.26) can be rewritten as 
𝐹(𝑠) =
1
𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 1
× (𝑇𝑠 +
1
𝑠
+
1
𝑘𝐿0
× 𝑅(𝑠)) × 𝑓0                    (5.27) 
Substituting Equation (5.25) into Equation (5.27) we have 
 If 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1 
𝐹(𝑠) =
1
𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 1
× (𝑇𝑠 +
1
𝑠
+
1
𝑘𝐿0
×
𝑟
𝑡1
×
1
𝑠2
) × 𝑓0                                       
= 𝑓0 × (
1
𝑠
+
1
𝑘𝐿0
×
𝑟
𝑡1
× (−
𝑇𝑠
𝑠
+
1
𝑠2
+
𝑇𝑠
𝑠 +
1
𝑇𝑠
))                (5.28) 
Using inverse Laplace transform for Equation (5.28) gives 
𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑓0 × [1 +
𝑟
𝑘𝐿0
× (𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡) ×
1
𝑡1
]                  (5.29) 
 If t > t1 
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𝐹(𝑠) =
1
𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 1
× [𝑇𝑠 +
1
𝑠
+
1
𝑘𝐿0
×
𝑟
𝑡1
×
1
𝑠2
× (1 − 𝑒−𝑡1𝑠)] × 𝑓0                        
= 𝑓0 × [
1
𝑠
+
1
𝑘𝐿0
×
𝑟
𝑡1
×
(1 − 𝑒−𝑡1𝑠)
𝑠2(𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 1)
]                                               (5.30) 
Using inverse Laplace transform for Equation (5.30) gives 
𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑓0 × [1 +
𝑟
𝑘𝐿0
× (𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−
𝑡−𝑡1
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡1) ×
1
𝑡1
]           (5.31) 
To conclude, the frequency dynamic model resulted from a linear ramp of 
generation starting at time 𝑡 = 0 and levelling at value “𝑟” at time 𝑡 = 𝑡1 is 
𝑓(𝑡) =
{
 
 𝑓0 × [1 +
𝑟
𝑘𝐿0
× (𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡) ×
1
𝑡1
]  𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1 
𝑓0 × [1 +
𝑟
𝑘𝐿0
× (𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−
𝑡−𝑡1
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡1) ×
1
𝑡1
]  𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 𝑡1
        (5.32) 
5.4.4 Model simplification 
To simplify the frequency dynamic models developed above, we denote 
𝜑 = 1 −
𝑓
𝑓0
𝛿𝑔 = −
𝑔
𝑘𝐿0
𝛿𝑟 =
𝑟
𝑘𝐿0
𝛿𝑙 =
𝑙
𝑘𝐿0
                                                      (5.33) 
Equations (5.18), (5.20), and (5.32) can now be rewritten as 
𝜑(𝑡) = −𝛿𝑔 × [1 − 𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠]                                         (5.34) 
𝜑(𝑡) = −𝛿𝑙 × [1 − 𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠]                                        (5.35) 
𝜑(𝑡) =
{
 
 −𝛿𝑟 × [𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡] ×
1
𝑡1
 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1 
−𝛿𝑟 × [𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−
𝑡−𝑡1
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡1] ×
1
𝑡1
 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 𝑡1
          (5.36) 
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In addition, as the frequency models given by Equations (5.34), (5.35), and 
(5.36) are linear, they can be combined to show a complete frequency trajectory in a 
frequency excursion event. For example, the frequency trajectory resulted from a loss 
of generation “𝑔”  at time 𝑡 = 0, followed by a generation ramp starting at time 
𝑡 = 𝑡1 and levelling at time 𝑡 = 𝑡2 at value “𝑟”, is given by combining Equations 
(5.34) and (5.36) as shown below 
𝜑 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1)                                                                             𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟 [𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡 − 𝑡1]
𝑡2 − 𝑡1
            𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟 [𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡2)
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡2 − 𝑡1]
𝑡2 − 𝑡1
       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡
   (5.37) 
5.4.5 Frequency dynamic model with frequency control services 
In this section, we will develop a complete frequency dynamic model taking 
into account the frequency control services. Practically, each frequency control 
service has a particular shape of response such as a step response for load shedding, 
an exponential response for governor actions, and a more linear response for a hydro 
unit in spinning reserve mode. In this thesis, we assume that frequency control 
services can be modelled by a linear ramp response. This model has two advantages. 
Firstly, it is a simple technology neutral model which can represent any of the real 
responses with required accuracy. For example, a fast ramp approximates a step 
response, and a series of ramps of decreasing slope approximates an exponential 
response. Secondly, the levelling value of the ramp can represent the amount of the 
corresponding control service. A similar method has been used by Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO) for dispatch of operating reserves deterministically [85]. 
Therefore, the complete frequency dynamic trajectory resulted from a loss of 
generation “𝑔” occurs at time 𝑡 = 0 with the participation of the power system 
frequency control can be represented by Equation (5.37) where “𝑟” is the amount of 
the control service. The frequency control is activated at time t = 𝑡1 which is the time 
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when the frequency exceeds the normal operating threshold 𝑓𝑛. It can be determined 
by solving Equation (5.34) with 
𝜑(𝑡) = 𝜑𝑛 = 1 −
𝑓𝑛
𝑓0
                                            (5.38) 
as shown below 
𝑡1 = 𝑡𝑛 = −𝑇𝑠 ln (
𝜑𝑛 + 𝛿𝑔
𝛿𝑔
)                                    (5.39) 
The next step is to check whether the frequency deviation will trigger the under 
frequency load shedding service by exceeding the UFLS threshold. Firstly, we need 
to calculate the minimum frequency using Equation (5.37). The frequency 𝑓 will 
reach its minimum value 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 at time 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 when 
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= 0                                                  (5.40) 
 If 𝑡𝑛 ≤ 𝑡𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑡2 Equation (5.40) can be rewritten as 
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝛿𝑔
𝑇𝑠
𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠  − 
𝛿𝑟
𝑡2 − 𝑡1
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑡−𝑡𝑛
𝑇𝑠 ) = 0                         (5.41) 
It then can be solved for variable 𝑡 as  
𝑡𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑇𝑠 ln [𝑒
𝑡𝑛
𝑇𝑠 −
𝑇𝑟𝛿𝑔
𝑇𝑠𝛿𝑟
]                                     (5.42) 
where  
𝑇𝑟 = 𝑡2 − 𝑡𝑛                                               (5.43) 
and hence  
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓0 [1 + 𝛿𝑔 +
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
(𝑡𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑡𝑛)]                           (5.44) 
 If t𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 > t2 
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𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝛿𝑔
𝑇𝑠
𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 + 
𝛿𝑟
𝑡2 − 𝑡𝑛
𝑒
−
𝑡
𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
𝑡𝑛
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
𝑡2
𝑇𝑠) = 0                 (5.45) 
Solving this equation we have 
𝑡𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 = +∞
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓0(1 − 𝛿𝑔 + 𝛿𝑟)
                                   (5.46) 
If the minimum frequency calculated in Equation (5.44) or (5.46) is lower than 
the UFLS threshold 𝑓𝑥, the UFLS will be activated. The determination of 𝑡𝑥 – the 
UFLS activation time is as follow. 
 If  𝑡𝑛 ≤ 𝑡𝑥 ≤ 𝑡2, 𝑡𝑥 can be calculated by solving the below equation 
1 −
𝑓𝑥
𝑓0
= 𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡𝑥
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡𝑥−𝑡𝑛)
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑡𝑛]            (5.47) 
It can be rewritten as 
𝑔(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑒−𝜏 + 𝑏𝜏 + 𝑐 = 0                                (5.48) 
where 
𝜏 =
𝑡𝑥
𝑇𝑠
                                                    (5.49) 
and 
{
  
 
  
 𝑎 = 𝛿𝑔 −
𝛿𝑟𝑇𝑠
𝑇𝑟
𝑒
𝑡𝑛
𝑇𝑠
𝑏 = −
𝛿𝑟𝑇𝑠
𝑇𝑟
𝑐 = −𝛿𝑔 −
𝛿𝑟(𝑇𝑠 + 𝑡𝑛)
𝑇𝑟
+
𝑓𝑥
𝑓0
− 1
                            (5.50) 
Equation (5.48) can be solved to find 𝜏 numerically using an iterative 
technique such as Newton-Raphson with  
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𝜏0 =
𝑡𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑡𝑛
2𝑇𝑠
                                                   (5.51) 
After that 𝑡𝑥 will be calculated using Equation (5.49). Assuming that an 
amount of load “l” is shed due to UFLS action at time 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑥, the frequency 
dynamic model in Equation (5.37) now becomes 
𝜑 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1)                                                                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡 − 𝑡1]         𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑥
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡 − 𝑡1] +                                
      +𝛿𝑙 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡𝑥)
𝑇𝑠 − 1)                                                     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑥 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡2)
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡2 − 𝑡1] +                   
+𝛿𝑙 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡𝑥)
𝑇𝑠 − 1)                                                   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡
   (5.52) 
 If t𝑥 > t2, solving the equation 
1 −
𝑓𝑥
𝑓0
= 𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡𝑥
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡𝑥−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−(𝑡𝑥−𝑡2)
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡2 − 𝑡1]          (5.53) 
give us 
𝑡𝑥 = 𝑇𝑠 ln [
𝛿𝑔 +
𝑇𝑠
𝑇𝑟
𝛿𝑟 (𝑒
𝑡2
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
𝑡1
𝑇𝑠)
𝛿𝑔 + 𝛿𝑟 + 1 −
𝑓𝑥
𝑓0
]                              (5.54)  
Assuming that an amount of load “l” is shed due to UFLS action at time 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑥, 
the frequency dynamic model in Equation (5.37) now becomes 
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𝜑 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1)                                                                                𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 1) + 𝑡 − 𝑡1]                 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡2)
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡2 − 𝑡1]    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑥
𝛿𝑔 (𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇𝑠 − 1) −
𝛿𝑟
𝑇𝑟
[𝑇𝑠 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡1)
𝑇𝑠 − 𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡2)
𝑇𝑠 ) + 𝑡2 − 𝑡1] +                              
+𝛿𝑙 (𝑒
−(𝑡−𝑡𝑥)
𝑇𝑠 − 1)                                                             𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑥 ≤ 𝑡
(5.55) 
Using the same approach, we can check whether the system frequency f will 
exceed other UFLS thresholds and when to develop the complete frequency dynamic 
model.  
5.5 Simulation results 
In this section, we will validate the frequency dynamic models developed in 
Section 5.3 by comparing with dynamic simulation results using DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory. Three study cases are considered. 
The first case studies the frequency deviation for a generation loss g1 = 100 
MW in a 50Hz power system with 1000 MW load. The generation loss occurs at time 
t0 = 0 followed by a ramp starting at time t1 = 0.2 and levelling at time t2 = 6.2 at 
value r1 = 100 MW. The load relief factor is k = 2. The system aggregate effective 
inertia after the generation loss is 8000 MWs. Fig. 5.3 compares the frequency 
trajectory given by Equation (5.37) with the simulation result using DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory. 
The second case studies the frequency deviation for a loss of generation           
g2 = 200 MW in the same 1000 MW system. The generation loss occurs at time t0 = 0 
followed by a ramp starting at time t1 = 0.2 and levelling at time t2 = 6.2 at value      
r2 = 200 MW. The load relief factor is k = 2. The system aggregate effective inertia 
after the generation loss is 7000 MWs. Fig. 5.4 compares the frequency trajectory 
given by Equation (5.37) with the simulation result using DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 
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Fig. 5.3. Comparison of frequency trajectories for a loss of 100 MW generation. 
The third case studies a more complex frequency deviation. It considers a loss 
of generation g3 = 200 MW occurring at time t0 = 0 in the 1000 MW system. The load 
relief factor is k = 2 and the system aggregate effective inertia after the generation 
loss is 6000 MWs. The minimum frequency for normal operation is 𝑓𝑛 =  49.85 𝐻𝑧. 
If the frequency exceeds this limit, the system frequency control service will be 
activated and fully deployed after 6 seconds. The amount of this service is                 
r3 = 100 MW. There are two under frequency load shedding threshold 𝑓𝑥1 = 48.7 𝐻𝑧 
and 𝑓𝑥2 = 48.34 𝐻𝑧. The amount of load will be shed for each UFLS threshold is 
𝑙 = 50 𝑀𝑊. 
Using our developed method presented in Section 5.3.5, the activation time of 
the frequency control service will be 𝑡𝑛 = 0.18 𝑠 and the frequency deviation will 
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trigger the two UFLS thresholds at 𝑡𝑥1 = 1.96 𝑠 and 𝑡𝑥2 = 3.90 𝑠. Fig. 5.5 compares 
the developed frequency dynamic model with the simulation result using DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory.  
 
Fig. 5.4. Comparison of frequency trajectories for a loss of 200 MW generation. 
The above results demonstrate the validity of the approximated frequency 
dynamic models. Please note that the spikes in the frequency differences are caused 
by time intervals used in numerical integration.  
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Fig. 5.5. Comparison of frequency trajectories for a loss of 200 MW generation with 
system frequency control services. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter presented the development of the mathematical model for 
frequency responses in generation-load imbalance events. Firstly, the fundamental 
dynamic model of the system frequency was built based on the traditional swing 
equation. Secondly, different factors affecting frequency trajectories were studied and 
modelled including system disturbances (e.g., loss of load or loss of generator), load 
relief factor, the inertial response of rotating machines, and various types of system 
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frequency support services. Finally, these models were combined to create the 
comprehensive frequency model.  
The developed mathematical model has been validated through a number of 
case studies. In these case studies, the frequency profiles obtained using the 
developed model were compared to the dynamic frequency trajectories obtained from 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory simulation software. The results showed that the 
mathematical model can represent the system frequency accurately taking into 
consideration various types of frequency control services. The developed method 
helps to reduce the overall computing and simulation time as well as provides the 
platform to incorporate the adequacy assessment of system frequency responses with 
the steady-state under voltage and overload evaluations as presented in Chapter 4. It 
may also play a key role in determining primary reserve level as presented in Chapter 
6.    
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Chapter 6   
Risk Assessment of Primary Frequency Response and 
Reserve Requirement for Wind Integrated Power 
Systems 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an application of the risk-based approach proposed in 
Chapter 4 to determine the operating reserve requirements in the presence of high 
WPG penetration. A case study is carried out to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed approach.  
Variability and uncertainty are not unique to wind generation. They also exist in 
aggregate power demand and supply resources and have always posed challenges for 
power system operators. Future demand cannot be perfectly predicted, motor loads 
and generator outputs can vary substantially in different time frames, and large power 
system equipment can fail at any given time without notice. Power system operators 
secure different amounts and types of operating reserves to compensate for these 
characteristics in order to serve load reliably and keep the system frequency stable. 
There are many different terms, definitions, and rules concerning what operating 
reserves entail. In this thesis, the term operating reserves is defined as the real power 
capability that can be given or taken in the operating timeframe to assist in generation 
and load balance and frequency control.  
The types of operating reserves can be differentiated by the type of event they 
respond to, the timescale of the response and the direction (upward or downward) of 
the response. The first characterization of a reserve is the type of event it is 
responding to. Some forms of operating reserve are kept for continuous needs (non-
events). Other operating reserves can be used to respond to either contingency events 
or longer timescale events. Contingencies are instantaneous failures such as the loss 
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of a generator or failure of a transmission line. Longer timescale events can include 
net load ramps and forecast errors that occur over a longer amount of time. 
In addition to the type of event, reserves can be categorised by the response 
time required and the physical capabilities needed of the responding participant. For 
instance, some reserves are required to be generating at partial load to provide 
spinning reserve, others require AGC, and still others require portions of their reserve 
to be directly responsive to frequency deviations. According to NERC the difference 
between spinning and non-spinning reserves is that spinning reserves must be 
synchronised to the system while non-spinning reserves are not necessarily 
synchronised. Spinning reserves respond more quickly as they are already 
synchronised to the system. AGC is a capability whereby a centralised party (system 
operator) sends control signals directly to the resource on the desired output. 
Frequency responsive capabilities include governor systems that automatically adjust 
input when frequency deviations are sensed.  
Reserves may also be categorised by whether more or less supply is needed. 
Upward response is required when there is less generation than load and can be 
attained by additional generating power or a reduction in participating loads. 
Downward response is required when there is more generation than load and can be 
attained by a reduction in generating power or an increase in participating loads. In 
this thesis, we use the response time to classify operating reserves into three 
categories including primary, secondary, and tertiary reserves as presented in   
Section 5.2. 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, wind energy is a variable resource with 
limited availability that changes in time (variability) and despite significant 
improvement of wind power forecasting it cannot be accurately predicted due to high 
uncertainty associated with future wind power values. At some stages, this variability 
and uncertainty may lead to significant load-generation imbalances resulting in large 
frequency deviations, which in turn, may cause unwanted load shedding (or, in some 
cases, lead to a system black-out). In addition, due to the asynchronism characteristic 
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of WPG, large wind penetration may also deteriorate the adequacy of PFR and the 
current practices used for determining primary reserves under low system inertia and 
insufficient number of machines providing frequency control, especially in small and 
isolated power systems. The adequacy of PFR is defined as the capability of power 
system reserves to prevent frequency from dropping below a certain limit [12]. 
The total system inertia plays an important role to limit RoCoF as well as 
frequency nadir. Increasing integration of non-synchronous converter-based 
generations such as WPG may reduce the inertial response leading to an increase in 
RoCoF, leaving insufficient time for PFR to deploy and arrest frequency deviations. 
If RoCoF is high enough, it can trigger the generator’s RoCoF protection tripping 
additional generators, which in turn increases the severity of the frequency deviation, 
and may lead to the system blackout. Fig. 6.1 shows an example of how inertia affects 
system frequency responses [86]. Low inertia also increases the phase shift during 
system disturbances, which in turn may affect operation of power electronics in 
particular operation of line commutated converters and phase lock loop (PLL) 
oscillators with the consequential impact on power generation or HVDC 
transmission. Therefore, it is important to secure a sufficient provision of system 
inertia. 
This chapter proposes a novel approach to evaluate the adequacy of primary 
frequency response in a power system with significant WPG. This approach is based 
on the risk assessment method presented in Chapter 4. Firstly, for fast evaluation of 
PFR adequacy without performing dynamic simulations the mathematical model of 
frequency trajectory in frequency excursion events developed in Chapter 5 is used. 
The evaluated risk of primary frequency response inadequacy is then included in a 
security-constrained economic dispatch to determine the primary reserve requirement. 
The effectiveness of the proposed approach is illustrated by its application to a test 
system under different scenarios. 
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Fig. 6.1. Illustration of inertia impact on system frequency responses. 
6.2 Risk assessment of primary frequency response and reserve 
requirement for power systems with high wind penetration 
To evaluate the adequacy of primary frequency response, we use the risk 
assessment approach presented in Chapter 4. The PFR inadequacy risk is calculated 
by Equations (4.8)-(4.14). After evaluating the adequacy of PFR, the resulted risk 
given by Equation (4.8) will then be used to determine the primary reserve 
requirement by co-optimizing with energy in a security-constrained economic 
dispatch in order to minimise the expected operation cost (EOC) given by 
 𝐸𝑂𝐶 = 𝐶𝑜𝐸 +  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝐶𝑜𝑃𝑅                   (6.1) 
where CoE is the cost of energy – the product of energy price  ($/MWh) and energy 
demand (MWh); and CoPR is the cost of primary reserve – the product of reserve 
price ($/MWh) and reserve demand (MWh). 
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6.3 Case study 
6.3.1 Case description 
A case study is performed to evaluate the proposed risk assessment approach. 
The test case system S1 is a small islanded power system with characteristics similar 
to the Tasmanian power network shown in Appendix B. The total installed generation 
capacity of the system is 2.9 GW with 2.2 GW of hydro, 400 MW of gas, and        
300 MW of wind generation. The power demand of S1 is approximately in the range 
of 800-1700 MW [76]. It is connected to a larger power system S2 (maximum 
demand 9000 MW) via a single monopolar HVDC link with a capacity to transfer 
maximum 500 MW of power and minimum 50 MW of power in both direction. The 
HVDC link is also equipped with a frequency controller allowing it to transfer 
frequency control services between the two systems subjected to the margins between 
its power flow and transfer limits. 
Figs. 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 show the system hourly pre-dispatch/forecast data for the 
next 24 hours sourced from [87]. Due to specific characteristics of the predominantly 
hydro-power system and its small size, the capability of providing fast frequency 
response in S1 is limited resulting in high cost of primary reserve, as can be seen in 
Fig. 6.4. In contrast, the cost of the primary reserve in S2 is much lower due to the 
dominance of thermal generation units that represent much cheaper sources of service 
in this system. In addition, the WPG level of S2 is negligible in comparison with the 
system size. The system inertia and capability of providing fast frequency responses 
are also strong. As a result, the reserve requirement for S2 is always set to the size of 
its largest online generator (550MW) and the PFR inadequacy risk of S2 is assumed 
to be negligible. 
The study objective is to determine the interconnection flow (negative for 
import to and positive for export from S1) and the primary reserve requirement for S1 
for each hour so that the operation cost of the two systems is minimised using the 
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approach proposed in Section 6.2. The results will then be compared with two other 
methods for primary reserve determination: 
 Method A: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 =  𝑃𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑥, which is the size of the largest online 
generator. This is one of the most common practices to schedule the amount 
of operating reserves so that the system will be able to withstand the outage 
of any single generating unit without the need of load shedding [72]. 
 Method B: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 =  𝑃𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 3 × 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 as proposed in [72] where 
𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 is the standard deviation of net-load (demand minus wind 
generation) forecasting error given by 
𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 = √𝜎𝑙
2 + 𝜎𝑤2      (6.2) 
The main objective of this method is to set the reserve amount so that it can 
cover the loss of the largest infeed as well as 99.73% of the possible net load 
forecast errors. 
 
Fig. 6.2. Normalised forecast demand and WPG. The base values of S1 demand, S2 
demand and S1 wind power are 1700 MW, 9000 MW and 300 MW, respectively. 
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Fig. 6.3. Hourly forecast energy prices. 
 
Fig. 6.4. Hourly forecast primary reserve prices. 
The contingency probabilities for S1 are calculated as explained in Section 
4.3.2. The outage replacement rates of the system components are determined based 
on the reliability data of the Tasmanian power network provided by TasNetworks. It 
is assumed that the failure probability of the interconnection link is zero. Load 
forecast errors are given by Equation (4.11) with a = 1.  Wind generation forecast 
errors are given by Equation (4.10) with 𝛼 = 0.01 and 𝛽 = 0.16 based on the data of 
1-hour WPG forecast in a region with a diameter of 360 kilometres [73]. Due to the 
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small size of the test system it is assumed that the wind speeds at all wind farms in S1 
are the same at any given moment.  
The system nominal frequency is 50Hz. The primary frequency control is 
activated once the system frequency drops below 49.85 Hz, and it take 6 seconds to 
reach its maximum value. This corresponds to the fast rise frequency control ancillary 
service (R6 FCAS) in Australia [78]. There are three under-frequency relay settings 
for the period of the primary control shown in Table 6.1. These settings are similar to 
the automatic under-frequency load shedding configuration used in [77]. The load 
relief factor is k = 1. The UIC is $12,500/MWh, which is the MPC often used in 
reliability studies in Australia [75]. 
 
6.3.2 Result evaluation 
6.3.2.1 Determination of reserve requirement 
Fig. 6.5 compares the hourly dispatch outcomes in terms of the EOC for the 
next 24 hours obtained using the proposed optimised approach against Method A and 
Method B. As can be seen, the optimised approach provides the least expensive 
solution for all 24 hours and can save up to 1.5% of EOC compared to the other two 
methods. This saving is rather modest due to a number of reasons. Firstly, as the size 
of S2 is much bigger than S1, its CoE accounts for more than 80% of the total EOC. 
Secondly, the saving is achieved by optimizing the primary reserve requirement and 
PFR inadequacy risk for S1 only, whereas the primary reserve amount of S2 is fixed 
and its PFR inadequacy risk is negligible as explained in Section 6.3.1. If the WPG 
Table 6.1 Under frequency relay setting 
Relay 
Load 
shedding 
block size (%) 
Frequency 
threshold 1 
(Hz) 
Time 
delay 1 
(s) 
Frequency 
threshold 2 
(Hz) 
Time 
delay 2 
(s) 
1 10 47.8 0.2 - - 
2 10 47.5 0.2 47.8 10 
3 10 47.2 0.2 47.5 2 
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level in S2 is large enough, the same optimization approach can be applied to S2 and 
bigger saving can be achieved. Meanwhile Method A (which sets the primary reserve 
amount equal to the largest online generator) results in the most expensive solution in 
15 hours. 
 
Fig. 6.5. Hourly expected operation costs obtained with the three approaches. These 
costs have been normalised based on the expected cost obtained with the proposed 
optimised approach. 
Fig. 6.6 shows the hourly dispatch outcomes including the interconnection flow 
and the S1 primary reserve provision. As can be seen, the energy price plays an 
important role in determining the interconnection flow. For example, from hour 16 to 
21 the interconnection flow is set to its maximum exporting level of 500 MW (S1 
exports energy to S2) to take the advantage of cheaper energy prices in S1. At this 
level of export, S1 can also access lower cost source of primary reserve in S2 as the 
HVDC interconnection link can transfer up to 450 MW of reserve from S2 to S1. On 
the other hand, from hour 0 to 9, energy is imported from S2 to S1 as the energy price 
in S2 during this period is much lower than in S1.  
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Fig. 6.6. (a) Interconnection flows and (b) S1 primary reserve provisions obtained 
with the three approaches. 
However, the amount of power imported might be limited to provide room for 
transferring reserve from S2 to S1 when needed as reserve price in S1 is often much 
higher than in S2. For example, during hour 2, the interconnection flow is set at 
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279.55 MW, 350 MW and 264.03 MW to provide room for 219.45 MW, 150 MW 
and 235.97 MW of reserve, respectively, using the optimised approach, Method A 
and Method B, respectively. In contrast, during the next two hours, 3 and 4, the 
interconnection flow is set to its maximum importing level of 500 MW (S1 imports 
500 MW from S2) using any of the three approaches as the difference between the 
reserve prices in S1 and S2 is very small compared to the difference between the 
energy prices in the two systems. During hour 15 the interconnection flow does not 
follow the sign of the difference in the energy prices. In this period, although the 
energy price in S2 is lower than in S1, the   interconnection flow is set to be positive 
or in other words, S1 exports energy to S2. The reason is that during this period the 
difference in energy price between the two systems is very small while the cost of 
reserve and the PFR inadequacy risk in S1 are high.  
Fig. 6.6 also shows that the reserve does not always need to cover the loss of 
the largest generator. For example, during hour 0 and 2, the optimised reserve 
amounts for S1 are 39.02 MW and 47.93 MW, respectively. The reason is that during 
these periods, the cost of providing primary reserve in S1 is higher than the benefit of 
having additional reserve. In contrast, in a number of cases, such as from hour 7 to 
13, the S1’s primary reserve is set very close to its maximum value to reduce the 
system PFR inadequacy risk. 
6.3.2.2 Impact of the installed wind power capacity  
Fig. 6.7 shows how the total expected cost of operation for the next 24 hours 
obtained with the optimised approach varies as a function of the installed wind power 
capacity. It is assumed that the pre-dispatch data are still the same while the installed 
capacity varies. These results show that the total operation cost increases as the 
installed capacity increases. This is a rather expected result as higher installed wind 
power capacities would lead to higher wind forecasting errors, and hence to higher 
system uncertainty. This may also reduce the number of synchronous generators 
online leading to a decrease in system inertia. As a result, the system PFR inadequacy 
risk increases and a larger reserve provision is required, as can be seen in Fig. 6.8. 
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However, we should note that with the higher installed wind power capacity, the 
energy price may drop [88]-[90], and a hence lower operation cost might be achieved. 
Additional WPG also reduces CO2 emissions, which in turn, could be translated into 
additional economic benefits. 
 
Fig. 6.7. Hourly expected operation costs obtained with the proposed optimization 
approach for three different levels of installed wind power capacity. These costs are 
normalised with the base cost = cost associated with the case having 300 MW of 
installed wind 
6.3.2.3 Impact of the system inertia  
Fig. 6.9 shows how the total expected cost of operation for the next 24 hours 
obtained with the optimised approach varied as a function of the system inertia. A 
minimum level of inertia is secured for each case. In this study, we do not consider 
the cost of inertia. As can be seen, the operation cost reduces as the minimum system 
inertia increases. In reality, increasing inertia incurs costs. In order to increase power 
system inertia, we can either operate generators on low load mode or dispatch 
synchronous condenser units to the grid. The former method may result in the 
generators operating away from their efficient rating, which leads to an increase in 
generation (fuel) cost. It may also increase the maintenance cost and reduce a plant’s 
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lifecycle as it may not have been designed for prolonged operation at low loading. 
The latter method incurs the cost of running synchronous condensers including 
energy drawn from the grid and maintenance cost. However, at present no electrical 
power system in the world has implemented a market or incentive based reward for 
providing inertia service [14], [91], [92]. 
 
Fig. 6.8. Variation of S1 primary reserve provision as a function of the installed wind 
power capacity. 
Although converter-based wind turbines have no inherent inertial response, they 
are capable of injecting more active power into the grid using their converter 
controller in frequency deviation events. There are two types of frequency responses 
a wind turbine can provide: synthetic inertial and governor-like (frequency droop) 
responses. The former utilises the kinetic energy stored in the wind turbine (e.g., 
generator, gearbox and blades). The release of kinetic energy from a wind turbine can 
be controlled independently from the RoCoF. In theory, it can even deliver a larger 
inertial response than a traditional synchronous generator. This is a highly desirable 
characteristic especially for small power systems with limited capacity to supply 
frequency control ancillary services. In these systems, WPG can provide fast 
frequency support in the first few seconds after a frequency disturbance occur to 
improve RoCoF and to buy time for other generators to respond through their 
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governor systems.  In a predominantly hydropower system, this may compensate for 
the initial reduction in power output, which is caused by pressure reduction due to 
opening of the wicket gate during the first few seconds [93]. 
 
Fig. 6.9. Variation of the total expected operation cost for the next 24 hours as a 
function of the minimum system inertia. These costs are normalised with the base 
cost = cost associated with the case of 4800 MWs inertia. 
However, if the wind turbine is operating below its rated wind speed when 
providing the synthetic inertial response, there will be a recovery period in which the 
turbine power output needs to be reduced for the turbine re-acceleration [23] [94], 
[95]. This period could delay the system frequency recovery or even cause a second 
frequency nadir, and hence requires more PFR [96]. Moreover, estimating the 
aggregated synthetic inertia from WPG is very challenging since there is uncertainty 
associated with the quantity of wind turbines being online for a given level of system 
wise wind generation [96], [97]. To achieve governor-like wind turbine responses the 
turbine is required to operate at a power output which is lower than the maximum 
output that can potentially be achieved at a given wind speed. In other words, wind 
power curtailment is required. This means that the turbine needs to operate at a sub-
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optimal operating point, which represents additional costs that need to be considered 
[63]. Further studies are required to assess the benefits of utilizing the frequency 
response of wind turbines as well as potential consequences before it can be widely 
implemented in power system operating schemes and considered in new ancillary 
service market designs. 
6.4 Discussion 
Increasing penetration of intermittent power generation will inevitably lead to 
the need to reconsider potential impacts of frequency events on the power system 
security, especially for small and islanded systems which are more vulnerable to 
frequency deviations. This is particularly important as frequency violations may 
become more frequent due to fault-ride-through characteristics of wind turbines, 
increasing volume of unobservable distributed and PV installations and inevitable 
forecast errors. The proposed method was applied to a small power system; however, 
large systems with weak interconnections and high renewable energy penetration can 
exhibit a similar behaviour under outage conditions making this approach universal. 
If the system of interest is part of the large interconnected network, the lost 
generation will be picked up by a large number of generating units outside the 
system’s immediate control area.  In this case, the pickup in generation will appear as 
an increase in power flow over the tie-line. To represent this situation, we could build 
a model of our own network, add an equivalent model of the large neighbouring 
system and place the swing bus in the equivalent system.  The generator outside 
would then be modelled to represent the inertia and fault level of the neighbouring 
system.  The inertia contribution of the neighbouring system would, however, be 
limited by the power transfer capability of the tie-line under various import/export 
scenarios.  This inertial contribution can be taken into account when calculating the 
total aggregate effective inertia of the system of interest. 
Finally, it should be noted that the proposed method can also be applied to 
Voltage-Sourced Converter (VSC) and Line-Commutated Converter (LCC) HVDC 
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schemes that include a frequency controller based either on the frequency error or the 
frequency differential between two systems.  These schemes are capable of injecting 
significant amount of energy to the system of interest almost instantaneously when 
this system experiences low frequency conditions.  To model this situation, we could 
represent the HVDC link as an equivalent generator contributing to frequency and 
voltage control. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a risk-based approach to assess the adequacy of primary 
frequency response, and then determined the primary reserve requirement taking into 
account WPG and load forecast uncertainties. The amount of primary reserve 
provision was determined so that the total system expected operation cost (i.e., the 
sum of the actual operating cost and the risk of primary frequency response 
inadequacy in terms of load interruption cost) was minimised.  
A case study was performed to demonstrate the performance of the proposed 
approach. The results showed that the risk-based approach has potential to deliver 
lower cost dispatch solution compared with the traditional methods which set the 
reserve requirement based on the largest generator infeed or a combination of the 
largest generator and the maximum net load uncertainty. The proposed approach was 
also able to assess the impact of the installed wind power capacity and the total 
system inertia on the expected cost of operation. However, since reserve market 
structures are generally system-specific, the simulation results and conclusions are 
only reflective of the particular case-study. More studies should be done with 
different power systems, particularly different generation mix and reserve market 
structures, to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method. 
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Chapter 7   
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
The increasing penetration of WPG raises a number of challenges in power 
system operation due to its variability, uncertainty and asynchronism characteristics. 
The current system operation practices mostly based on deterministic criteria may no 
longer be adequate to deal with power systems with high penetration of WPG. 
This thesis proposed a novel probabilistic risk-based approach to quantitatively 
assess security of a power system with large penetration of WPG for short-term 
operation planning. A risk index representing both the likelihood and consequences of 
contingencies and system uncertainty caused by WPG and load forecasting errors was 
used to evaluate the system security. The consequences of system failures were 
estimated using expected cost of load interruption. The proposed security assessment 
approach is concerned with steady-state voltage and overload evaluations, as well as 
frequency response adequacy. For illustrating purposes, the proposed approach was 
used to evaluate operation risks of the simplified model of the Tasmanian power 
system under a number of operation scenarios. The results showed that the integration 
of WPG significantly affected the system operation risk, especially risks associated 
with inadequacy of frequency responses. Impacts of different factors including load 
and WPG forecasting uncertainties, wind power penetration levels, and operating 
reserves on the system security were investigated. It also showed that the proposed 
approach could assist system operators in operation planning such as setting 
constraints for wind generation curtailments and determining operating reserves. 
One of the main contributions of this thesis is the development of mathematical 
models of frequency trajectories so that the adequacy assessment of system frequency 
responses can be performed simultaneously with the steady-state voltage and 
overload evaluations in the overall system security assessment. It takes into account 
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both the system inertia and frequency control ancillary services. A series of 
simulations demonstrates the validity of the developed mathematical models. 
Increasing penetration of intermittent power generation, particularly WPG, will 
inevitably lead to the need to reconsider potential impacts of frequency events on the 
system security, especially for small and islanded systems which are more vulnerable 
to frequency deviations. This is particularly important as frequency violations may 
become more frequent due to fault-ride-through characteristics of wind turbines, 
increasing volume of unobservable distributed and PV installations and inevitable 
forecast errors. The proposed method was applied to a small power system; however, 
large systems with weak interconnections and high renewable energy penetration can 
exhibit a similar behaviour under outage conditions making this approach universal. 
The proposed risk-based approach is then further developed to formulate an 
optimised security-constrained economic dispatch to determine the primary reserve 
requirement in a power system with significant wind generation. Firstly, the adequacy 
of primary frequency response is assessed. The amount of primary reserve provision 
is then determined so that the total system expected operation cost (i.e., the sum of the 
actual operating cost and the operation risk associated with inadequacy of primary 
frequency response capability in terms of load interruption cost) is minimised. A 
number of case studies are performed to demonstrate the performance of the proposed 
approach. The results show that the risk-based approach has potential to deliver lower 
cost dispatch solution compared with the traditional method setting the reserve 
requirement based on the largest generator infeed and the combined method which 
sets the reserve provision as the sum of the largest generator and the net load 
uncertainty. The proposed approach is also able to assess the impact of the installed 
wind power capacity and the total system inertia on the expected cost of operation. 
To summarise, the main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1. Development of a novel approach to quantitatively evaluate operation risk 
associated with steady-state under voltage, line overload and inadequacy of 
system frequency responses. It takes into consideration both the probability 
and severity of system uncertainty including random contingencies, load 
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and WPG forecast errors. 
2. Development of an analytical method to represent system frequency 
approximately (accurately) in generation-load imbalance events without 
running dynamic simulation. The method helps to reduce the overall 
computing time and incorporate the adequacy assessment of system 
frequency responses with the steady-state under voltage and overload 
evaluations. 
3. Development of a cost effective approach to determine operating reserve 
requirements. The approach co-optimises system operation risks associated 
with frequency response inadequacy and actual operating cost (i.e., cost of 
energy and reserve).      
7.2 Suggestions for future work 
In this section a few ideas that might enhance the proposed approaches are 
discussed. 
1. This thesis does not consider the impact of initial conditions in calculating 
the probability of random contingencies and operating conditions (i.e., load 
and wind generation forecast errors). It is therefore more applicable for 
hourly operating decisions for the next day. The next step is to take into 
account the impact of initial conditions so that the methodology presented 
in this work can be used for operating decisions in real time knowing the 
initial condition. 
2. In the case studies presented it was assumed that the random contingencies 
occur at a given period of time and that they do not extend beyond that 
period. This is, however, optimistic in real systems, and hence a more 
advanced model taking into account the multi-period effect of the 
contingencies could be used to improve the proposed approaches. 
3. In this thesis, a wind farm is considered as a single generator with 
aggregated capacity in calculating its contingency probability for the sake 
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of simplicity. However, alternative approaches could be used to enhance 
the accuracy of the proposed method, e.g., using equivalent outage 
replacement rate of individual wind turbines. 
4. In addition, advanced models of wind power forecast errors could be used 
to improve the performance of the proposed method. 
5. The case studies presented in this thesis are based on the Tasmanian power 
network which is a small island system connected to a much larger system 
via an HVDC link. Therefore, the correlation between wind farms is 
assumed to be 100% (i.e., the wind speeds are the same at any wind farm). 
Large systems with more complex WPG scenarios and different wind 
correlations should be studied. Different generation mix and reserve market 
structures should also be considered.   
6. The proposed security assessment method is also applicable to systems 
with AC interconnection lines. In that case, the external system will be 
taken into consideration as a slack bus with infinite inertia which is 
connected to the test system via tie-lines. But the inertia contribution of the 
external system to the test system’s frequency control is limited by the tie-
lines capability at various import/export scenarios. This inertia contribution 
will be taken into account when we calculate the total aggregate effective 
inertia of the test system. 
7. In this work, we assume that frequency control services can be modelled by 
a linear ramp response. Practically, each frequency control service has a 
particular shape of response such as a step response for load shedding or an 
exponential response for governor actions. Future work may take this into 
account to better evaluate the adequacy of system frequency responses. The 
wind turbine capability of providing frequency support might also be taken 
into consideration. 
8. In reality, operating reserves cater for both random generator outages and 
outage of any network component such as transmission line. For example, 
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in some topologies the outage of transmission lines might limit the 
operating reserves even though enough spare generation capacity is 
scheduled. Therefore, the impact of the transmission system on the power 
flows throughout the network and on the operation risk must be considered. 
An optimal power flow should be included with the proposed reserve 
determination approach to achieve the overall optima considering the 
transmission constraints. Generator ramping capability should also be 
considered. 
9. The VOLL value takes a very important role in the results of the proposed 
approaches. In the thesis, this value is assumed to be constant. However, in 
reality it should be presented as a distribution curve as there is always a 
stack with more expensive available generation and depending on actual 
shortage the price might be much lower. 
10. Future work will be interesting to include PV integration (along with WPG) 
for similar study. 
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Appendix A   
Basic Probability Concepts 
A.1 Random variable and its distribution 
A random event can be represented using a random variable. Given a 
continuous random variable X, the probability of X being not larger than a real 
number x is a function of x. This function is called the cumulative distribution 
function F(x) of the random variable X, which can be expressed in the following 
form: 
𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑥
−∞
                                                 (A. 1) 
where 𝑓(𝑥) is the probability density function. Obviously 
𝑓(𝑥) =
𝑑𝐹(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥
                                                    (A. 2) 
The probability of X lying between a and b is given by 
𝑃(𝑎 ≤ 𝑋 ≤ 𝑏) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑏
𝑎
                                                 (A. 3) 
For a discrete random variable, its probability density function can be expressed as 
𝑝𝑘 = 𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑥𝑘)      𝑘 = 1,2, …                                      (A. 4) 
and its cumulative probability distribution function is 
𝐹(𝑥𝑘) = 𝑃(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑘)      𝑘 = 1,2, …                                      (A. 5) 
The relationship between the density and cumulative distribution functions of a 
discrete random variable is given by 
𝐹(𝑥𝑘) =∑𝑝𝑖
𝑖≤𝑘
      𝑘 = 1,2, …                                      (A. 6) 
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𝑝𝑘 = 𝐹(𝑥𝑘) − 𝐹(𝑥𝑘−1)                                            (A. 7) 
A.2 Four important distributions in risk assessment 
A.2.1 Exponential distribution 
The exponential distribution is a single-parameter distribution. Its density 
function is given by 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝜆𝑒−𝜆𝑥           (𝑥 ≥ 0)                                         (A. 8) 
The cumulative distribution function is given by 
𝐹(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥 −
(𝜆𝑥)2
2!
+
(𝜆𝑥)3
3!
− ⋯                        (A. 9) 
These two functions are shown in Figs. A.1 and A.2. When 𝜆𝑥 ≪ 1, Equation (A.9) is 
approximated by 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝜆𝑥                                                       (𝐴. 10) 
The mean and variance of the exponential distribution are 1/𝜆 and 1/𝜆2, respectively. 
 
Fig. A.1. Cumulative distribution function of exponential distribution. 
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Fig. A.2. Probability density function of exponential distribution. 
A.2.2 Normal distribution 
The density function of normal distribution is given by 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝜎√2𝜋
exp [−
(𝑥 − 𝜇)2
2𝜎2
]            (−∞ ≤ 𝑥 ≤ ∞)           (A. 11) 
where 𝜇 and 𝜎2 are the mean and variance of the normal distribution. By using the 
following substitution, 
𝑧 =
𝑥 − 𝜇
𝜎
                                                                (A. 12) 
Equation (A.11) can be rewritten as 
𝑓(𝑧) =
1
√2𝜋
exp [−
𝑧2
2
]            (−∞ ≤ 𝑧 ≤ ∞)                      (A. 13) 
This is the density function of the standard normal distribution. Fig. A.3 shows the 
probability density function of the normal distribution. 
There is no explicitly analytical expression for the cumulative distribution 
function of the normal distribution. The area Q(z) under the standard normal density 
function shown in Fig. A.4 can be found from the following polynomial 
approximation for 𝑧 ≥ 0: 
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𝑄(𝑧) = 𝑓(𝑧)[𝑏1𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑡
2 + 𝑏3𝑡
3 + 𝑏4𝑡
4 + 𝑏5𝑡
5]                            (A. 14) 
where 
𝑡 =
1
1 + 𝑟𝑧
 
𝑟 = 0.2316419 
𝑏1 = 0.31938153 
𝑏2 = −0.356563782 
𝑏3 = 1.781477937 
𝑏4 = −1.821255978 
𝑏5 = 1.330274429 
 
Fig. A.3. Probability density function of normal distribution. 
The maximum error of Equation (A.14) is smaller than 7.5 × 10−8. Fig. A.5 shows 
some examples of the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution.  
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Fig. A.4. Area under standard normal density function. 
 
Fig. A.5. Cumulative distribution function of normal distribution. 
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A.2.3 Log-normal distribution 
The density function of the log-normal distribution is 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑥𝜎√2𝜋
exp [−
(ln 𝑥 − 𝜇)2
2𝜎2
]            (𝑥 > 0)           (A. 15) 
It is important to recognise that 𝜇 and 𝜎2 are not the mean and variance of the log-
normal distribution. The mean, E(x), and variance, V(x), of the log-normal 
distribution are given by 
𝐸(𝑥) = exp(𝜇 +
𝜎2
2
)                                                (A. 16) 
𝑉(𝑥) = exp(2𝜇 + 𝜎2)[exp(𝜎2) − 1]                              (A. 17) 
If the mean and variance of the log-normal distribution are pre-specified, the 
parameters 𝜇 and 𝜎2 in Equation (A.17) are calculated by 
𝜇 = ln [
𝐸2
√(𝑉 + 𝐸2)
]                                                       (A. 18) 
𝜎2 = ln [
𝑉 + 𝐸2
𝐸2
]                                                       (A. 19) 
Examples of the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of the log-
normal distribution are shown in Figs. A.6 and A.7, respectively. 
A.2.4 Weibull distribution 
The density function of Weibull distribution is given by 
𝑓(𝑥) =
𝑘𝑥𝑘−1
𝜆𝑘
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−(
𝑥
𝜆
)𝑘]          (∞ > 𝑥 ≥ 0, 𝑘 > 0, 𝜆 > 0)              (A. 20) 
The cumulative distribution function is 
𝐹(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−(
𝑥
𝜆
)𝑘]          (∞ > 𝑥 ≥ 0, 𝑘 > 0, 𝜆 > 0)              (A. 21) 
Figs. A.8 and A.9 show examples of these two functions.  
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Fig. A.6. Probability density function of log-normal distribution. 
 
Fig. A.7. Cumulative distribution function of log-normal distribution. 
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Fig. A.8. Probability density function of Weibull distribution. 
The mean and standard deviation of the Weibull distribution can be calculated from 
the scale λ and shape k parameters as follows: 
𝜇 = λΓ (1 +
1
𝑘
)                                                    (A. 22) 
𝜎2 = λ2 [Γ (1 +
2
𝑘
) − Γ2 (1 +
1
𝑘
)]                                     (A. 23) 
where Γ is the gamma function which is defined as 
Γ(x) = ∫ 𝑡𝑥−1𝑒−𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
−∞
                                                (𝐴. 24) 
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Fig. A.9. Cumulative distribution function of Weibull distribution 
There is no analytical expression for the scale λ and shape k using the mean 𝜇 
and the standard deviation 𝜎 but the following method can be used. By eliminating λ 
from Equations (A.31) and (A.32) we have 
Γ (1 +
2
𝑘
)
Γ2 (1 +
1
𝑘
)
= 1 +
𝜎2
𝜇2
                                                  (A. 25) 
Using an approximate expression of the gamma function [98], Equation (A.25) can be 
rewritten as 
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(1 +
2
𝑘
)(0.5+
2
𝑘
) × 𝑒−(1+
2
𝑘
) × [1 +
1
12
(1 +
2
𝑘
)]
√2𝜋 [(1 +
1
𝑘
)(1+
2
𝑘
) × 𝑒−(2+
2
𝑘
) × [1 +
1
12
(1 +
1
𝑘
)]
2
]
= 1 +
𝜎2
𝜇2
               (A. 26) 
Equation (A.26) can be solved to obtain k using a bifurcation algorithm. Then λ is 
calculated from Equation (A.23) using k and 𝜎.  
A.3 Numerical characteristics 
Random variables can be simply described using one or more parameters that 
are called numerical characteristics. The most useful numerical characteristics in risk 
evaluation are the mathematical expectation (mean), variance or standard deviation, 
covariance, and correlation coefficients. As a matter of fact, a risk is a mean value, 
whereas a standard deviation of an estimate is often used as an indicator of the 
accuracy in Monte Carlo simulation. 
A.3.1 Mathematical expectation 
If a random variable X has the probability density function f(x) and the random 
variable Y is a function of X, that is, y=y(x), then the mathematical expectation or 
mean value of Y is defined as 
𝐸(𝑋) = ∫ 𝑦(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
                                                (𝐴. 27) 
As a special case of the general definition, the mean of the random variable X is 
𝐸(𝑋) = ∫ 𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
                                                  (𝐴. 28) 
For a discrete random variable, Equations (A.27) and (A.28) can be rewritten as 
𝐸(𝑌) =∑𝑦(𝑥𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                  (𝐴. 29) 
𝐸(𝑋) =∑𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                         (𝐴. 30) 
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A.3.2 Variance and standard deviation 
The variance of a random variable X with the probability density function f(x) is 
given by 
𝑉(𝑋) = 𝐸{[𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋)]2} = ∫ [𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋)]2𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
                    (𝐴. 31) 
The variance is an indicator for the dispersion degree of possible values of X from its 
mean. The square root of the variance is known as the standard deviation and is often 
denoted as 𝜎(𝑋). If X is a discrete random variable, its variance is given by 
𝑉(𝑋) =∑[𝑥𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑋)]
2𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                          (𝐴. 32) 
A.3.3 Covariance and correlation coefficients 
Given an N-dimension random vector (𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑁), the covariance between 
any two elements 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗 is defined as 
𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝐸{[𝑋𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑖)][𝑋𝑗 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑗)]} = 𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑗) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑖)𝐸(𝑋𝑗)         (𝐴. 33) 
The covariance is often expressed as 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑗). The covariance between an element 
and itself is its variance 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) = 𝑉(𝑋𝑖)                                               (𝐴. 34) 
The correlation coefficient of 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗 is defined as 
𝜌𝑖𝑗 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)
√𝑉(𝑋𝑖)𝑉(𝑋𝑗)
                                               (𝐴. 35) 
The absolute value of 𝜌𝑖𝑗 is smaller or equal to 1.0. If 𝜌𝑖𝑗 = 0, then 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗 are not 
correlated. If 𝜌𝑖𝑗 > 0, then 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗 are positively correlated. If 𝜌𝑖𝑗 < 0, then 𝑋𝑖 and 
𝑋𝑗 are negatively correlated. 
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